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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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360 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

2. Th e Army in Hawaii didn’t have enough fi ghter planes for the<br />

necessary reconnaissance because <strong>of</strong> “the diversion <strong>of</strong> this type [<strong>of</strong> plane]<br />

. . . to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch <strong>and</strong> the Russians.” 21<br />

3. U.S. soldiers <strong>and</strong> sailors responded to the Japanese attack—<br />

within four minutes <strong>of</strong> the launching <strong>of</strong> the fi rst Japanese torpedo—<br />

<strong>and</strong> the intensity <strong>of</strong> their fi ring increased to such an extent that the<br />

third <strong>and</strong> last wave <strong>of</strong> Japanese planes “was driven <strong>of</strong>f without getting<br />

the attack home.” Although Knox praised the valor <strong>of</strong> U.S.<br />

personnel in fi ghting back when attacked, he didn’t mention the<br />

promptness with which they got into action, nor the fact that the<br />

intensity <strong>of</strong> their fi ring increased to such an extent that the third<br />

<strong>and</strong> last wave <strong>of</strong> Japanese planes, only an hour <strong>and</strong> 20 minutes<br />

after the fi rst one, 22 “was driven <strong>of</strong>f without getting the attack<br />

home, no eff ective hits being made in the harbor.”<br />

4. Th e unsuitability <strong>of</strong> <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> as a site for a large concentration<br />

<strong>of</strong> naval vessels. In his report, Knox raised the question.<br />

In view <strong>of</strong> the attack <strong>and</strong> the serious damage infl icted by it,<br />

the usefulness <strong>and</strong> availability <strong>of</strong> this Naval station must be<br />

studied. . . . Pending these studies <strong>and</strong> the addition <strong>of</strong> satisfactory<br />

safeguards, no large concentration <strong>of</strong> Naval vessels can be<br />

permitted at <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>.<br />

Knox recognized that Admiral Richardson had had reasonable<br />

grounds for the doubts he had raised with FDR concerning<br />

the advisability <strong>of</strong> holding the fl eet at <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>. 23<br />

While for security reasons some <strong>of</strong> these points could not be<br />

revealed, it would have been possible to admit (1) surprise, (2)<br />

inadequate equipment, (3) prompt retaliation, <strong>and</strong> (4) previous<br />

21 Ibid., part 5, p. 2342, from Knox’s report on his trip to Hawaii.<br />

22 Ibid., p. 2340. See also Homer N. Wallin, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: Why, How, Fleet<br />

Salvage <strong>and</strong> Final Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division,<br />

1968) pp. 88, 150, 166.<br />

23 Ibid., part 5, p. 2345, from Knox’s report on his trip to Hawaii.

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