Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

358 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
learn, contained “all the information that could then, with the
security of the nation at stake, be released to the public.” 16 Th e
Army and Navy “were to assume equal responsibility and blame
for the damage caused by the Japanese attack—and for the failure
to be prepared for such an attack.” 17
Knox’s Press Conference
Th at afternoon 200 newspaper reporters fi led into Knox’s
offi ce. With FDR’s “pencilled notes” as a guide, Knox issued a
formal release and fi elded the reporters’ questions. 18 Except for his
praise of the performances of U.S. servicemen during the attack,
his release bore little resemblance to the report he had made to
the president. It began:
16 Ibid.
My inspection trip to the island enables me to present the
general facts covering the attack which hitherto have been
unavailable:
1. Th e essential fact is that the Japanese purpose was to knock
out the United States before the war began. Th is was made
apparent by the deception practiced, by the preparations which
had gone on for many weeks before the attack, and the attacks
themselves, which were made simultaneously throughout the
Pacifi c. In this purpose the Japanese failed.
2. Th e United States services were not on the alert against the
surprise air attack on Hawaii. Th is fact calls for a formal investigation,
which will be initiated immediately by the president.
. . . We are all entitled to know it if (a) there was any error of
judgment which contributed to the surprise, (b) if there was
any dereliction of duty prior to the attack. 19
17 Ibid., p.14.
18 Th e New York Times, December 16, 1941, pp. 1, 7.
19 Knox’s formal statement, as published in ibid.