Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

356 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
the southern approach to the islands, considered the most likely
direction from which an attack might be expected; they made no
contacts with enemy craft. Th e Navy’s condition of readiness was
described as “Condition Th ree,” which meant that about onehalf
of the broadside and anti-aircraft guns were manned, and
all of the anti-aircraft guns were supplied with ammunition
and were in readiness. 12
Th e Japanese air force planes had swept over Pearl Harbor in
three waves. “Th e torpedo planes, fl ying low, appeared fi rst over
the hills surrounding the harbor, and in probably not more than
sixty seconds were in a position to discharge their torpedoes.” Th e
fi rst wave was “substantially,” but not completely, unopposed. “Th e
fi rst return fi re from the guns of the fl eet began, it is estimated,
about four minutes after the fi rst torpedo was fi red, and this fi re
grew rapidly in intensity.” Th e second wave over the harbor “was
resisted with far greater fi re power and a number of enemy planes
were shot down. Th e third attack over the harbor,” about an hour
and 20 minutes after the fi rst, “was met by so intensive a barrage
from the ships that it was driven off without getting the
attack home, no eff ective hits being made in the harbor by this
last assault.” 13
Knox and his companions visited the Naval Hospital, where
they saw hundreds of wounded, many suff ering horribly from
burns and shock. He was distressed by the huge numbers of dead
and wounded: “Th e sight of those men made me as angry as I
have ever been in my life. It made me realize what a big job lay
ahead of us.” 14 He was tremendously impressed also by the courage,
daring, and heroism demonstrated by many servicemen and
12Ibid., p. 2339.
13Ibid., p. 2340.
14Barnes interview with Beatty, cited above, p. 9.