Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Public Had Questions 355
presence of large numbers of alien Japanese in Honolulu.” Th e
Army’s sabotage alert “unfortunately” called for
bunching the planes on the various fi elds on the Island, close
together, so that they might be carefully guarded against possible
subversive action by Japanese agents. . . . Th is bunching of
planes, of course, made the Japanese air attack more eff ective. 8
Short’s fear of a Japanese “fi fth column” was by no means
unjustifi ed. Japanese agents had “provided the Japanese Navy
with exact knowledge of all necessary details to plan the attack,”
including
exact charts showing customary position of ships when in Pearl
Harbor, exact location of all defenses, gun power and numerous
other details. Papers captured from the Japanese submarine
that ran ashore indicated that the exact position of nearly every
ship in the harbor was known and charted. 9
It is acknowledged that “the best means of defense against air
attack consists of fi ghter planes.” However, the number of such
planes available to the Army for the defense of the Island was
far from adequate. Th is, Knox remarked in his report, was “due
to the diversion of this type [of plane] before the outbreak of the
war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.” 10
“Th e next best weapon against air attack is adequate and welldisposed
anti-aircraft artillery.” Th e “dangerous shortage” of this
type of gun, Knox reported, is “through no fault of the Army
Commander who has pressed consistently for these guns.” 11
Th e Army carried out no morning patrol on December 7. Th e
Navy sent out at dawn a ten-bomber air patrol, which searched
8 Ibid.
9Ibid., pp. 2342–43.
10Ibid., p. 2342.
11 Ibid.