Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

354 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
take place nearer Japan’s base of operations, that is, in the Far
East. 4
An air attack had appeared
extremely unlikely because of the great distance which the Japs
would have to travel to make the attack and the consequent
exposure of such a task force to the superior gun power of the
American fl eet. 5
Moreover, they had not expected an attack by the Japanese
while negotiations were still going on in Washington, as the
Hawaiian press had reported.
Kimmel had received a “general warning” from the Navy
Department on November 27. His chief fear had been of a
submarine attack, and he had made “all necessary provisions to
cope with such an attack.” 6 As a matter of fact, the air attack
was accompanied by a submarine attack. Two Japanese submarines
were sunk, one ran ashore, and one small two-man submarine
penetrated the harbor. According to Knox at the time of the
attack
Neither Short nor Kimmel had any knowledge of the plain
intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washington
through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura,
in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by
the insistence upon the precise time of Nomura’s reply to Hull,
at 1:00 on Sunday. 7
In contrast to Kimmel, Short had considered sabotage “the
most imminent danger to the Army . . . because of the known
4Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 5, p. 2338. From Knox’s report on
his trip.
5Ibid. 6Ibid., part 5, p. 2338. From Knox’s report.
7Ibid., part 5, p. 2342. From Knox’s report.