Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Public Had Questions 353
instructions precisely. Th ey landed on Oahu on the morning of
December 11.
Once on the ground, Knox and his companions saw wreckage
everywhere. Th e air station at Kaneoho seemed to have been
“completely devastated.” So far as they could see, “no planes
remained in fl ying condition. Th e wreckage of Navy PBY seaplanes
which had been shot to pieces or burned were visible on
the ramps and in the water. Th e large hangars were burnt out.”
Pearl Harbor presented a
tragic picture. . . . [A]ll of our modern battleships, save the
Colorado, were there, damaged in various degrees. Th e Arizona,
a shattered mass of wreckage with smoke still pouring from
her debris. Th e Oklahoma capsized. Th e Maryland, Tennessee,
and Pennsylvania bombed or torpedoed. Th e Nevada grounded
near the hospital, bombed in her valiant eff ort to clear the
harbor. 2
Admiral Kimmel met Knox and his companions at the Royal
Hawaiian Hotel, “grim and unlike the gay tourist hotel of peacetime
days.” 3 Th ey met some of Kimmel’s staff at his quarters.
Later General Short joined them.
Neither Kimmel nor Short attempted to justify their lack of
readiness to oppose the attack. Th ey readily acknowledged that
Th e Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on December
7th was a complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy. Its
initial success . . . was due to a lack of a state of readiness against
such an air attack. . . . While the likelihood of an attack without
warning by Japan was in the minds of both General Short and
Admiral Kimmel, both felt certain that such an attack would
2 Harry Elmer Barnes 1953 interview of Vice Admiral Frank E. Beatty, on fi le
at Naval Academy Library, Annapolis, p. 8.
3 Ibid., p. 7.