Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

338 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
inroads on China itself and possibly attack the Malay Straits.
He also thought they would attack Russia at an opportune
moment. Th is would have left the president with the very diffi
cult problem of protecting our interests [in the Far East].
He always realized that Japan would jump on us at an opportune
moment and they would merely use the “one by one” technique
of Germany. Hence, his great relief at the method that
Japan used. In spite of the disaster at Pearl Harbor and the
blitz-warfare with the Japanese during the fi rst few weeks, it
completely solidifi ed the American people and made the war
upon Japan inevitable. 85
* * * * *
Judging from reports of a number of the president’s intimate
associates who saw him on December 7, after he had learned of
the Japanese attack, he was unquestionably more soothed than
surprised by the news. He was truly fl abbergasted at the actual
site of the attack, and he was shaken by the large unexpected
losses to his beloved Navy. However, it came as a relief to him that
Japan had not bypassed American territory to attack the British
or Dutch.
FDR had faced a domestic dilemma. Th e New Deal had
failed to end the depression. Unemployment in 1939 was as high
as when he took offi ce in 1933. Only Selective Service and the
war orders of France and England had succeeded in eliminating
unemployment. Increased employment in the United States had
been fi nanced fi rst by French and British gold and then, under
lend-lease, by infl ation and increased public debt. Without such
continued war production, the New Deal, on which FDR’s great
popularity rested, would have been revealed as an illusion and the
85Sherwood, Th e White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, pp. 432–33, and
Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 428.