01.01.2013 Views

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

336 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

Jersey, Majority Floor Leader John W. McCormack, Minority<br />

Floor Leader Joseph W. Martin, Jr. 80<br />

Th e president began by giving them<br />

a very frank story <strong>of</strong> what had happened, including our losses.<br />

Th e eff ect on the Congressmen was tremendous. Th ey sat in<br />

dead silence <strong>and</strong> even after the recital was over they had very<br />

few words [to say]. Th e president asked if they would invite<br />

him to appear before the Joint Houses tomorrow <strong>and</strong> they<br />

said they would. He said he could not tell them exactly what<br />

he was going to say to them because events were changing so<br />

rapidly. 81<br />

Th e White House meeting didn’t wind up until after 11:00.<br />

As the cabinet <strong>of</strong>fi cers <strong>and</strong> congressional leaders were fi ling out,<br />

Postmaster General Frank Walker said to Secretary <strong>of</strong> Labor<br />

Frances Perkins, “I think the Boss really feels more relief than he<br />

has had for weeks.” 82 She agreed.<br />

Mrs. Perkins wrote later,<br />

A great change had come over the president since we had seen<br />

him on Friday. Th en, he had been tense, worried, trying to be<br />

optimistic as usual, but it was evident that he was carrying an<br />

awful burden <strong>of</strong> decision. Th e Navy on Friday had thought<br />

it likely it would be Singapore <strong>and</strong> the English ports if the<br />

Japanese fl eet meant business. What should the United States<br />

do in that case? I don’t know whether he had decided in his<br />

own mind; he never told us; he didn’t need to. But one was<br />

conscious that night <strong>of</strong> December 7, 1941, that in spite <strong>of</strong> the<br />

terrible blow to his pride, to his faith in the Navy <strong>and</strong> its ships,<br />

80Sherwood, Th e White House Papers <strong>of</strong> Harry L. Hopkins, p. 437, <strong>and</strong> Roosevelt<br />

<strong>and</strong> Hopkins, p. 433. See also excerpt from Stimson diary entry, December 7<br />

( Joint Committee, part 11, p. 5439).<br />

81Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 11, p. 5439, excerpt from Stimson<br />

diary entry, December 7, 1941.<br />

82Perkins, Th e Roosevelt I Knew, p. 380.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!