Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

334 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
A message from the U.S. naval attaché in Australia, Merle-
Smith, the transmission of which had been held up 17 hours
at the request of the Australian authorities, was also received
in Washington on December 7. It reported on the threatening
movement of the Japanese in the southeast Pacifi c. A strike from
the Japanese island of Pelau, aimed at Menado, on the northern
coast of Celebes, Dutch East Indies, and/or at Ambon, appeared
imminent. Th e Dutch had ordered execution of plan A–2, calling
for joint operations by the Australians and the Dutch. And the
Dutch Indies forces were mobilizing. 73
FDR’s Evening Meetings with Cabinet
and Congressional Leaders
As the cabinet offi cers entered the Oval Offi ce for the 8:30
p.m. meeting, the president was seated at his desk. He nodded to
everyone as they came in, but there was
none of the usual cordial, personal greeting. Th is was one of
the few occasions he couldn’t muster a smile. However, he was
calm, not agitated. He was concentrated; all of his mind and all
of his faculties were on the one task of trying to fi nd out what
had really happened. 74
Th e members of the cabinet faced him in a semi-circle. FDR’s
secretary, Steve Early, sat at his side.
Knox’s face was drawn and white. Before the meeting started
he confi ded to Stimson that “we had lost seven of the eight battleships
in Hawaii.” (As Stimson wrote in his diary, “Th is, however,
proved later to be exaggerated.”) 75
73Ibid., part 9, p. 4566.
74Perkins, Th e Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946), p. 379.
75Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5349, excerpt from Stimson
diary entry, December 7, 1941.