Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

332 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
In view of the crisis, the president, at Hopkins’s suggestion,
decided to call a special meeting of his entire cabinet for 8:30 that
evening. He then asked also to have the congressional leaders
come to the White House to confer with the president after the
cabinet meeting was over.
CNO Stark Replies to Admiral Hart in Manila
For weeks, especially during the last few days, Washington’s
attention had been riveted on the western Pacifi c and the likelihood
of a Japanese landing in Th ailand, the Kra peninsula,
Singapore, Malaya, or the Dutch East Indies. If the Japanese
struck any of those areas, the British and Dutch were expected
to fi ght. And if the British and Dutch fought, the United States
was committed to helping them militarily. In view of the fact that
our commitment was not only secret but also unconstitutional,
the administration had been faced with a dilemma. Th e question
had been, as Stimson stated on November 25, “how we should
maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of fi ring the fi rst
shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.” 70 But if the
Japanese attacked us, we would be justifi ed in responding. Th us,
the attack at Pearl Harbor had let us off the hook.
Th e Hart-Phillips cable, asking how Hart should respond
to Creighton’s news from Singapore, was a reminder of the U.S.
commitment to the British. 71 Th e cable had reached Washington
during the night of December 6–7, but because of the rash of
Japanese intercepts it had not been decoded promptly. It became
available only on the morning of December 7, and it was not
until after the attack that Stark had a chance to reply. His answer
referred to the incoming cable paragraph by paragraph. It was
70Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5433, Stimson’s diary report
on the White House meeting of November 25.
71Ibid., part 4, pp. 1933–35, Hart-Phillips December 7, 1941, report from
Manila.