Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

328 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
had gotten through to Marshall’s offi ce without any trouble. Yet
Deane had had diffi culty trying to call Pearl Harbor on behalf
of the Chief of Staff . According to Deane, the War Department
personnel that next week were all “at sixes and sevens . . . totally
unprepared for what had happened.” 58
Stimson’s Afternoon
After hearing the news and fi nishing his lunch, Stimson
returned to his offi ce. He “started matters going in all directions
to warn against sabotage and to get punch into the defense move.”
Armed guards were stationed at the War Department building
and also at Stimson’s estate. He off ered to provide guards for the
White House, but it was decided the FBI should stand guard
there. 59
Stimson attended FDR’s meeting at the White House. Th en
at 4:00, he joined McCoy and the chiefs of the armed services,
giving them “a little pep-up talk about getting right to work in
the emergency.” He spent most of the afternoon in conference
with Marshall, Grenville Clark, Miles, Patterson, McCoy, and
their assistants, Lovett and General Gullion, the provost marshal
general. Th e main topic of their conversation was the form
the declaration of war should take. “Grenville Clark had drawn
up a copy based largely on the Woodrow Wilson one.” Th ey “all
thought that it was possible we should declare war on Germany
at the same time with Japan.” But that was “an open question.”
However, Stimson thought there was now “no doubt about
declaring war on Japan.” 60
When Stimson had fi rst heard the news of Japan’s attack, his
“fi rst feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a
58Deane interview.
59Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5439, Stimson diary
excerpt.
60Ibid., p. 5438.