Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 327
Marshall reached his offi ce within ten 54 or fi fteen 55 minutes of
receiving Deane’s telephone call.
Marshall had many phones in his offi ce, all hung on the side
of his desk. He had no sooner arrived than they all began to ring
at once. A regular stream of phone calls started coming in. Deane
gave Marshall one instrument and then another phone would
ring. Roosevelt called on the direct line from the White House,
asked Marshall what he knew, but Marshall had to admit that
he didn’t know much. At that point another phone on the side
of Marshall’s desk rang. Deane answered and when he fi nished
talking, he inadvertently hung the phone on the Roosevelt connection
on the side of Marshall’s desk, temporarily closing off the
Roosevelt-Marshall conversation. Deane quickly shifted it, but
he later recalled that his fi rst act of the war had been to cut off a
telephone conversation between the Commander-in-Chief and
the Army Chief of Staff . 56
Marshall sent word of the attack out to all the corps area
commanders and all our people throughout the world, particularly
in the Philippines. 57
Roosevelt asked Marshall to come over to the White House
right away and Marshall immediately dashed over.
Th e fi rst call that came in after Marshall left was from a drunk
in St. Louis, who had just heard what those “bastards” had done
and off ered to come to Washington to help Marshall out. Deane
thanked the caller and said he would relay his off er to Marshall.
To Deane, this incident illustrated how ill-prepared the Chief of
Staff ’s offi ce was for the emergency; a call from a plain citizen
54Ibid., part 14, p. 1411, Deane June 8, 1942, memorandum for General W.B.
Smith.
55Author’s interview of Deane, January 2, 1964.
56Ibid. 57Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5439, Stimson diary
except.