Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

326 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
“Well,” Stimson replied, “I have heard the telegrams which
have been coming in about the Japanese advances in the Gulf of
Siam.”
“Oh, no,” the president responded. “I don’t mean that. Th ey
have attacked Hawaii. Th ey are now bombing Hawaii.”
“Well,” Stimson thought, “that was an excitement indeed!”
His reference to “the Japanese advances in the Gulf of Siam”
was to the British patrol’s sightings of large Japanese forces south
of Indochina and moving up into the Gulf. It had appeared that
these forces were going to land probably either on the eastern
side of the Gulf of Siam, where it would be still in Indochina,
or on the western side, where it would be the Kra Peninsula,
or probably Malay. Th e British were very much excited about
it and our eff orts this morning in drawing our papers was
to see whether or not we should all act together. Th e British
will have to fi ght if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three
[Stimson, Hull, Knox] all thought that we must fi ght if the
British fought.
Th at was the reason for their Sunday morning meeting at the
State Department and for the position papers they had drafted—
“to see whether or not we should all act together. . . . But now,”
Stimson confi ded to his diary, “the Japs have solved the whole thing
by attacking us directly in Hawaii.” 53 (Italics added)
The Afternoon in Marshall’s Office
Deane had phoned Marshall immediately after receiving
the news of the attack. It was about a ten-minute drive
from Marshall’s quarters at Fort Myer to his offi ce in the War
Department. Although it had taken Marshall a couple of hours
to respond to Bratton’s frantic phone call that morning, this time
53 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5438, Stimson diary excerpt,
as reprinted in Joint Committee hearings.