Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

324 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
the decoded Japanese intercepts that morning—the 14-part reply
to our note of November 26, and the “One p.m. Message”—so
he knew what to expect. However, the two ambassadors didn’t
appear at 1:00. Rather they phoned again a few minutes after
1:00 asking to have their appointment postponed until 1:45. Hull
agreed. 47
He was still waiting for the ambassadors when the president
telephoned from the White House shortly after 1:30. “Th ere’s
a report that the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor.” FDR’s
voice was steady but clipped. In view of his impending appointment
with the ambassadors, Hull was especially interested. “Has
the report been confi rmed?” Not yet, the president said, but it
would be checked. 48
Th e ambassadors arrived at the State Department and were
in the diplomatic waiting room even as Hull and the president
spoke. Hull kept them waiting while he consulted his advisers—
Green H. Hackworth, legal adviser, and Joseph W. Ballantine, a
foreign service offi cer, who had participated with Hull in most
of his conversations with the Japanese. “Th e president has an
unconfi rmed report,” Hull told them, “that the Japanese have
attacked Pearl Harbor. Th e Japanese Ambassadors are waiting
to see me. . . . Th ey are going to turn us down on our note of
November 26,” he said. “Perhaps they want to tell us that war has
been declared. I am rather inclined not to see them.” 49
Hull thought over the situation and fi nally decided that “since
the president’s report had not been confi rmed and there was one
chance out of a hundred that it was not true, [he] would receive
the envoys.” Hull summoned the ambassadors to his offi ce. 50
47Cordell Hull, Th e Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan, 1948), vol.
2, p. 1095.
48Ibid. 49Ibid., p. 1096.
50 Ibid.