Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

322 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
“simply stated what was in the message . . . [Knox] had no further
details and . . . [FDR] would be kept advised.” 43
Roosevelt was fi nishing a late lunch with Harry Hopkins. Th e
president couldn’t believe what he had heard. Nor could Hopkins;
he didn’t think Japan would dare to attack Honolulu. “Th ere must
be some mistake,” he said. 44 But there was no mistake.
FDR immediately began telephoning. He called Hull. He
called Marshall. He called Stimson. And FDR began receiving
phone calls too, from persons all around the world. Winston
Churchill was among the callers.
It was Sunday evening in England when Churchill heard the
news on a small wireless radio in his dining room at Chequers, the
Prime Minister’s residence just outside London. With him at the
time were U.S. Ambassador John Winant and Averell Harriman,
then a special representative of the president with ambassadorial
rank. Churchill immediately placed a call to Roosevelt:
“Mr. President,” he began, “what’s this about Japan?”
“Th ey have attacked us at Pearl Harbour,” FDR replied. “We
are all in the same boat now.”
Winant spoke briefl y with FDR, and then Churchill got
back on the line. “Th is certainly simplifi es things,” he said. “God
be with you,” or words to that eff ect. According to Churchill,
Winant and Harriman
took the shock with admirable fortitude. . . . Th ey did not wail
or lament that their country was at war. Th ey wasted no words
43 Ibid., p. 3837.
44 Robert Sherwood, Th e White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins. 2 vols. (London:
Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948), vol. 1, p. 435, and Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate
History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 430–31; and Henry H.
Adams, Harry Hopkins: A Biography (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977),
p. 258.