Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

318 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Two minutes before 4:00 a.m. a blinker signal from the
minesweeper Condor informed the Ward that it had sighted “a
suspicious object” believed to be a submarine “apparently heading
for the entrance” of the harbor. “Outerbridge immediately
ordered the ship to general quarters. . . . Th e ship sprang to life.”
For nearly an hour she combed a wide area in the dark, conducting
a sonar search. Nothing was located. So the men aboard the
Ward relaxed. 27
But then at 6:37 a.m. Outerbridge was again aroused from
his bunk. Th is time he saw the U.S. target ship Antares towing
a raft to Pearl Harbor. Between ship and raft the lieutenant saw
“a smaller object which had no right to be there . . . a submarine
conning tower . . . unlike any submarine’s silhouette with which
he was familiar.” In view of his orders to attack any unauthorized
submarine in the area, Outerbridge did not hesitate: “Load
all guns and stand by to commence fi ring.” Th e fi rst shot was a
near miss. “Number 3 gun opened up . . . on the pointer fi re, like
a squirrel rifl e, with a point-blank range of 75 yards. . . . [T]he
projectile was seen to strike the conning tower.” And the submarine
disappeared from view. Th e Ward then reported its next
move: “We have dropped depth charges on sub operating in
defensive area.” Th en a few minutes later a follow-up message:
WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DROPPED
DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBMARINE OPERATING
IN DEFENSIVE AREA. 28 It was 6:53 a.m. Hawaii time. 29
In 1941, the Army was in the process of installing three large
fi xed radars on high ground in Hawaii, and six mobile radar units.
Th is new radar service was operative daily from 4 a.m. to 4 p.m.
only, the hours Short considered “the most dangerous time for
27Karig, Battle Report, pp. 13-14.
28Ibid., pp. 14–16.
29Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 57, Outerbridge testimony
before the Hewitt Inquiry.