Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 317
of not less than 150 patrol planes, adequate spare parts and
ample well-trained personnel. We had 81 patrol planes in the
whole Hawaiian area, including Midway. 21
Because of the shortage, the Hawaiian patrols were “operating
on a shoestring.” 22
“Th e Fleet operating areas were searched daily,” and as planes
were available rotational sweeps were conducted of those sectors
thought to be most dangerous. Th e planes accompanying the
task forces sent out from Hawaii to Wake and Midway were also
scouting morning and afternoon over 60° sectors to 300 miles on
either bow. 23 On the morning of December 7 three patrol planes
were in the air over the fl eet operating areas at Pearl Harbor and
four other planes were aloft, carrying out exercises with submarines.
Th is was in addition to the three task forces at sea that “were
conducting a regular wartime search by aircraft and destroyers, as
required by fl eet orders.” 24
During the early morning hours of December 7, the USS
Ward, captained by Lieutenant William Woodward Outerbridge,
was steaming back and forth at low speed patrolling the sea lanes
converging on Pearl Harbor. 25 Outerbridge’s orders were that “any
submarine operating in the restricted area—not operating in the
submarine areas and not escorted—should be attacked.” 26
21Ibid., part 8, p. 3454, Testimony of Admiral Patrick Bellinger, commander,
Patrol Wing Two, Pearl Harbor. See also Homer N. Wallin, Pearl Harbor: Why,
How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: Naval History
Division, 1968), p. 45.
22Ibid., p. 45, quoting Bellinger letter, January 16, 1941.
23Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, p. 329, Halsey testimony
before the Hart Inquiry.
24Wallin, Pearl Harbor, p. 46.
25Karig, Battle Report, pp. 6–8.
26Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, pp. 56–57, Outerbridge testimony
at Hewitt Inquiry.