Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

U.S. International Policy: 1933–1940 11
and that they had even “shipped some munitions before China
had promised to pay for them.” 10
U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew wired Hull that
“there was not suffi cient evidence to justify the hypothesis that
‘either the Japanese Government or the Army deliberately engineered
the [Marco Polo Bridge] incident in order to force a
showdown.’ ” Grew also found that communist agitators contributed
to the crisis by “disseminating misinformation with regard
to the concentration of both Chinese and Japanese troops.” 11
Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out. Tokyo announced a “punitive
expedition against the Chinese troops, who have been taking
acts derogatory to the prestige of the Empire of Japan.” Th is was
the beginning of the undeclared Japanese-Chinese war. Bombers
struck three cities and shelled others as ground troops attacked
Chinese forces all over the Peking area.
Th e outbreak of fi ghting between the Japanese and the
Chinese aroused strong feelings among many in the United
States who had emotional ties to China. Th e Neutrality Act then
in force prevented the U.S. from using U.S. ships to send arms to
either side. On September 14, acting under this Act, FDR forbade
the shipment of arms on U.S. government-owned ships to either
China or Japan, thus averting the possibility of a Japanese blockade
of U.S. shipping had aid to China been allowed. Th roughout
this entire period, U.S. and British trade was continuing, in accord
with China’s agreement to open the country to foreign traders.
In Chicago on October 5, 1937, President Roosevelt spoke
out against nations that were engaging in aggression:
Th e peace, the freedom, and the security of 90 percent of the
population of the world is being jeopardized by the remaining
10 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers,
Th e Far East, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Offi ce), vol. 3,
pp. 136, 165, et passim.
11 Tansill, Back Door to War, p. 460.