Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 315
A December 6 story was headlined NEW PEACE EFFORT
URGED IN TOKYO—JOINT COMMISSION TO IRON
OUT DEADLOCK WITH U.S. PROPOSED. In Hawaii it
looked as if the immediate crisis had passed, even though another
December 6 story struck a more ominous note: JAP PRESS
ASKS FOR WAR. 12
On the basis of radio intelligence, Commander Joseph John
Rochefort, offi cer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at
Pearl Harbor, noted two signifi cant factors. Th e Japanese, who
usually changed their radio call signs no more often than once
every six months, introduced new call signs on December 1, just
one month after their last previous change. 13 Rochefort considered
it ominous also when he realized he had lost track of the
Japanese aircraft carriers. 14 It was considered possible that they
“were still located in home waters” 15 communicating with radio
waves too weak to be picked up in Hawaii. However, Rochefort
thought that they might be “moving eastward.” 16 As a matter
of fact, he had located practically the entire Japanese fl eet that
attacked Pearl Harbor “in a negative sense.” He had lost them; he
didn’t know where they were. 17
Rochefort called the loss of contact with the Japanese carriers
to the attention of Commander Edwin Th omas Layton,
fl eet intelligence offi cer and combat intelligence offi cer. Layton
“showed the location, to the best of [his] knowledge, of the
major portion of the Japanese Fleet” 18 on his “Communication
12Ibid., p. 11.
13Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, p. 4680, Rochefort testimony
before the Joint Committee. Ibid., pp. 4836–37, Edwin Th omas Layton testimony
before the Joint Committee.
14Ibid., p. 4682, Rochefort testimony before the Joint Committee.
15Ibid., pp. 4837–38, Layton testimony before the Joint Committee.
16Ibid., p. 4680, Rochefort testimony before the Joint Committee.
17Ibid., p. 4681.
18Ibid., p. 4838, Layton testimony before the Joint Committee.