Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! 313
Hawaiian Commanders Warned
of Japanese Threat to Philippines,
Thai, Kra Peninsula, Borneo
On November 27, fl eet Commander-in-Chief Kimmel in
Hawaii was sent a “war warning” advising that Japanese troops
were apparently preparing “an amphibious expedition against
either the Philippines Th ai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo.”
Th e same cable also went to fl eet Commander-in-Chief Hart in
Manila. Both commanders were told to implement WPL-46, the
U.S. war plan then in eff ect, which provided for preparing to take
off ensive action. 6 Th en on November 28, Short was advised that
“all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities
. . . to provide for protection of your establishments, property,
and equipment against sabotage.” He took this as Washington
approval of his earlier sabotage alert. 7
With all clues pointing to a war with Japan erupting in
southeast Asia, Short and Kimmel expected their primary concerns
would be to defend the mid-Pacifi c U.S. outposts—Guam,
Wake, and Midway—and to carry out WPL-46 by attacking the
Japanese-held Marshall Islands. Th ey continued drilling their men
and preparing for war. Kimmel was directed from Washington
to reinforce Wake and Midway with men and planes. So on
November 28 and December 5, he sent out from Hawaii two task
forces, under heavy security and in a state of combat readiness, 8
with reinforcements for Wake and Midway. 9
6Ibid., p. 1406, Chief of Naval Operations TOP SECRET cable #272337.
7Ibid., p. 1330, War Department SECRET cable 482 to Short.
8Ibid., part 26, pp. 321–24, Admiral William F. Halsey testimony before the
Hart Inquiry.
9Ibid., p. 43, Admiral John Henry Newton testimony before the Hart
Inquiry.