Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

312 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
“assured” that they “would get what [they] needed at the time
[they] needed it.” 1
Th e commanders in Hawaii received some advice by way of
telegraphic reports from Washington and the Philippines. But
otherwise, the information available to them was what they
gleaned from “intercepting all Japanese naval traffi c, and of
attacking all the Japanese naval systems contained in that traffi c
with the exception of one system, which was being worked on in
Washington, and in Cavite.” Th ey had “a radio intelligence unit
whose duties were to obtain all information available from the
Japanese naval traffi c by means other than cryptanalysis,” and they
had a “mid-Pacifi c direction-fi nding unit.” 2 Th ey also received
reports from observers, analyzed directional radio beams, and
decoded and translated Japanese messages transmitted in PA-K2
and certain lower classifi ed, nondiplomatic codes. 3
It was obvious to the Hawaiian commanders from the cables
they received from Washington, as well as from accounts appearing
in the Hawaiian press concerning the Japanese-U.S. conversations,
that relations between the two countries were tense. On
November 27, General Short was advised that “Negotiations with
Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes.” Short
was asked “to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures
as . . . necessary but . . . not . . . to alarm civil population.” 4 To
minimize the damage that might be done by local Japanese who
were antagonistic to the United States, Short alerted for sabotage
and so advised Washington. 5
179th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 10, pp. 4845–46.
2Ibid., part 10, pp. 4673, 4687, testimony of Commander Joseph John Rochefort.
3Ibid., pp. 4674, 4676, 4677.
4Ibid., part 14, p. 1328.
5 Ibid., p. 1330.