Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

308 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
support” to the British and Dutch was diffi cult. FDR relied on
the advice of his three secretaries, Knox, Hull, and Stimson. And
that was, as Stimson put it, “what we were at work on our papers
about” that morning. 103 Roosevelt would not ask for a declaration
of war, but he would conclude by announcing his intention to
embark on a de facto war: “As Commander in Chief, I have given
appropriate orders to our Forces in the Far East.” 104
In addition to working on his proposed speech, Roosevelt
must also have been thinking about the White House meeting
of his “War Cabinet” he had called for 3:00 p.m. that afternoon.
He apparently wanted to discuss his intended address with his
advisers and to talk with them about “the possible showdown
that might follow in the Far East.” 105
Lunch Break
At about 12:30, after being reassured that his warning message
to his fi eld commanders was on its way, Marshall left for
lunch at his quarters. 106 Hull’s meeting with Knox and Stimson
wound up in time for lunch. Knox and Stimson left the State
Department, Knox for his offi ce and Stimson for lunch at his
spacious estate, Woodley. 107 When Knox returned to his offi ce in
the Navy Department, he found a message from Admiral Stark
who wanted him to phone. Knox immediately called Stark and
103Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5438. Excerpt from Stimson’s
December 7, 1941 diary reprinted in Joint Committee hearings.
104National Archives, Civilian Records Branch, Record Group 59, Entry 398,
Box 3, Location 250/46/04/01, 30pp. Hornbeck draft. FDR’s intended speech
printed in full in Appendix.
105Pogue, George C. Marshall: 1939–1942, p. 221.
106Deane interview.
107Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5438, excerpt from Stimson
diary quoted in Joint Committee hearings.