Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Morning of the Fateful Day 307
pen in Th ailand, Malaya, the Dutch Indies, and ‘possibly’ the
Philippines.” 102
In between these several interruptions, FDR was working
on the draft of a speech, which had been prepared in the State
Department that he contemplated delivering to Congress the
following Tuesday or Wednesday if he received no response to his
message to Emperor Hirohito. Phrasing what he wanted to say
was a diffi cult proposition, in view of his pledge to the American
people that he would not send our boys to fi ght on foreign soil
“except in case of attack” and in view of the Constitutional provision
that only Congress could declare war. Eight months of U.S.
negotiations with Japan in the attempt to reach a peaceful solution
had ended in failure. FDR had decided he would present
the issue as one of national defense. He would compare Japanese
aggressions with those of the Nazis in Europe. He would describe
Japan’s conquest and exploitation in China and point out that she
was now threatening the Philippines and British and Dutch territories
in Southeast Asia, as well as trade routes of vital importance
to them and to us. Japan’s practice of aggression and conquest
sets up a continuing and growing military threat to the United
States. . . .Within the past few days large additional contingents
of troops have been moved into Indo-China and preparations
have been made for further conquest. . . .We cannot
permit, and still less can we support, the fulfi lment by Japan
of the aims of a militant leadership which has disregarded law,
violated treaties, impaired rights, destroyed property and lives
of our nationals, infl icted horrible suff erings upon peoples who
are our friends.
How to respond to the current crisis in the light of FDR’s
pledges to the American people and his assurances of “armed
102Herbert Feis, Th e Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1950), p. 340.