Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

306 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
advantage of Great Britain’s extremity and strike at Singapore or
some other point in the Far East, but an attack on any American
possession did not enter his [FDR’s] thought.” In McIntire’s
view, the president clearly “counted only on the usual evasions”
from the two ambassadors. 99
FDR was also in touch that Sunday morning with the British
ambassador, Lord Halifax. Halifax had sent to the White House
for Roosevelt’s comments a copy of the British government’s proposed
message to Japan. He was waiting at the British embassy
for a phone call from Roosevelt. 100
China was also very much in FDR’s thoughts. Th e Chinese
government had appreciated his eff orts to strangle Japan economically.
As a result, Chinese ambassador Hu Shih and FDR
had developed a close and confi dential relationship. Roosevelt
had tried to get in touch with Hu the day before, but he had been
in New York. On his return Sunday morning, he returned FDR’s
call, and the president summoned him to the White House for a
confi dential chat. Hu arrived about 12:30. FDR showed him the
statement he had sent the Japanese emperor, his “very last gesture
toward peace,” Roosevelt said. “[I]f Hirohito didn’t respond—
well, it would be war!”
FDR told Hu about the Japanese envoys’s insistence on a
1:00 p.m. appointment with Hull. Roosevelt expected “either an
answer [from Hirohito] or a nasty move from the Japs before
Tuesday morning.” 101 He fully “expected ‘foul play’; he had a feeling
that within forty-eight hours something ‘nasty’ might hap-
99 Ibid., pp. 136–37.
100 Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax (Houghton Miffl in, 1966), p. 530.
101 Helen Lombard, While Th ey Fought: Behind the Scenes in Washington, 1941–
1946 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), p. 10.