Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

304 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
self-defense. “Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture
of it. . . . Knox also had his views as to the importance of showing
immediately how these diff erent nations must stand together.”
Stimson had both men dictate their views to a stenographer. 93
Hull stated in his “Proposed Statement” for the president that
the Japanese government,
dominated by the military fi reeaters, [was] deliberately proceeding
. . . to acquire military control over one-half of the
world with nearly one-half its population. . . . [D]efense of life
and commerce and other invaluable rights and interests in the
Pacifi c area must be commenced with the South Sea area. 94
According to Knox’s typed-up “Suggestion,” we were
tied up inextricably with the British [and Dutch] in the present
world situation. . . . [A]ny serious threat to the British or the
Dutch is a serious threat to the United States. . . . We should
therefore be ready jointly to act together. 95
Hull, Knox, and Stimson “stayed together in conference
until lunch time, going over the plans for what should be said or
done.” 96
Japanese Ambassadors Request One P.m.
Appointment with State Secretary Hull
Ambassador Nomura telephoned Hull about noon to ask
for an appointment for himself and Kurusu at 1:00. Hull agreed.
93Ibid., p. 5437, excerpt from Stimson diary quoted in Joint Committee hearings.
94 Ibid., pp. 5439–40. Proposed Hull statement.
95 Ibid., p. 5440. Knox suggestions.
96Ibid., p. 5437, excerpt from Stimson diary quoted in Joint Committee hearings.