Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
The Morning of the Fateful Day 301 and retransmitted in San Francisco. Th e Army’s normal method when atmospheric conditions prevented sending messages via its own radio station was to use commercial facilities that were available in the Army’s Signal Center—Western Union to San Francisco, tube relay across the city, and then RCA to Honolulu. 79 So French decided “the quickest method of dispatch would be via commercial service,” especially as RCA had just installed a teletype circuit to Fort Shafter, Army headquarters in Hawaii, on the western outskirts of Honolulu. 80 When Bratton returned to Marshall’s offi ce, Marshall asked him to go back to the Message Center and fi nd out how long it would take for his message to reach its several addressees. Bratton returned, talked with French, who told him “that the messages would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about 30 minutes.” 81 With respect to the message to Honolulu, French estimated that it would reach there “within a half hour to 45 minutes.” 82 Bratton “looked at [his] watch at that time and, as [he] remember[ed] it, it was about 11:58 a.m.” 83 Bratton reported back to Marshall. Marshall’s message was in code by 11:52 a.m. (Washington D.C. time) and was dispatched to Panama at noon, to the Philippines at 12:05, to the Presidio in San Francisco at 12:11, and to Hawaii at 12:17. 84 It was Marshall’s understanding that his message went right through to the Philippines, Panama, and San Francisco. Th e only problem came in raising Hawaii. 85 79Ibid., part 34, p. 33, French testimony during Clarke Investigation. 80Ibid. See also part 27, pp. 108–10, French testimony before the APHB. 81Ibid., part 34, p. 21, Bratton statement before the Clarke Inquiry. 82Ibid., p. 33. French statement before the Clarke Inquiry. 83Ibid., part 9, p. 4519, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. See also part 34, p. 21. 84Ibid., part 33, p. 1282. 85Ibid., p. 823. Marshall testimony before the NCI.
302 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy By noon Deane had fi nished the one-page statement he had been preparing for Marshall to use that afternoon at his meeting with FDR and/or for testifying the next day before Congress. Marshall called him into his offi ce, and he handed Marshall his memorandum. As Marshall read it, he said to Deane, “it looks as though the Japs were going to issue an ultimatum about 1:30.” Deane had not known of the information that administration and top military offi cials had been learning during recent months from MAGIC, so was not aware of the signifi cance of Marshall’s announcement. 86 Sunday Morning at the State Department Hull went to his offi ce that Sunday morning “as [he] had done almost every Sunday since [he] entered the State Department in 1933.” Because of the Japanese situation, however, this one was a little out of the ordinary. Hull talked fi rst with the department’s Far Eastern experts—Stanley K. Hornbeck, adviser on political Relations; Maxwell M. Hamilton, chief of the division of Far Eastern aff airs; and Joseph W. Ballantine, an expert on Japan. 87 Hull had asked Stimson and Knox to meet with him at the department at 10:00 a.m. to discuss “the situation created by the movement of the huge Japanese armada southward and westward of the southernmost point of Indochina.” 88 Th e administration offi cials “were striving to ascertain the full signifi cance of those military movements, their probable destination, etcetera.” 89 86Deane interview. 87Cordell Hull, Th e Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan, 1948), vol. 2, p. 1095. See also Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull: Th e American Secretaries of State and Th eir Diplomacy (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964), vols. 12 and 13, p. 517. 88Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5393, Hull’s reply to Joint Committee interrogatory. 89Ibid., p. 5394.
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<strong>The</strong> Morning <strong>of</strong> the Fateful Day 301<br />
<strong>and</strong> retransmitted in San Francisco. Th e Army’s normal method<br />
when atmospheric conditions prevented sending messages via<br />
its own radio station was to use commercial facilities that were<br />
available in the Army’s Signal Center—Western Union to San<br />
Francisco, tube relay across the city, <strong>and</strong> then RCA to Honolulu. 79<br />
So French decided “the quickest method <strong>of</strong> dispatch would be<br />
via commercial service,” especially as RCA had just installed a<br />
teletype circuit to Fort Shafter, Army headquarters in Hawaii, on<br />
the western outskirts <strong>of</strong> Honolulu. 80<br />
When Bratton returned to Marshall’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce, Marshall asked<br />
him to go back to the Message Center <strong>and</strong> fi nd out how long it<br />
would take for his message to reach its several addressees. Bratton<br />
returned, talked with French, who told him “that the messages<br />
would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about<br />
eight minutes, <strong>and</strong> in the h<strong>and</strong>s <strong>of</strong> the addressees in about 30<br />
minutes.” 81 With respect to the message to Honolulu, French<br />
estimated that it would reach there “within a half hour to 45<br />
minutes.” 82 Bratton “looked at [his] watch at that time <strong>and</strong>, as<br />
[he] remember[ed] it, it was about 11:58 a.m.” 83 Bratton reported<br />
back to Marshall.<br />
Marshall’s message was in code by 11:52 a.m. (Washington<br />
D.C. time) <strong>and</strong> was dispatched to Panama at noon, to the<br />
Philippines at 12:05, to the Presidio in San Francisco at 12:11,<br />
<strong>and</strong> to Hawaii at 12:17. 84 It was Marshall’s underst<strong>and</strong>ing that<br />
his message went right through to the Philippines, Panama, <strong>and</strong><br />
San Francisco. Th e only problem came in raising Hawaii. 85<br />
79Ibid., part 34, p. 33, French testimony during Clarke Investigation.<br />
80Ibid. See also part 27, pp. 108–10, French testimony before the APHB.<br />
81Ibid., part 34, p. 21, Bratton statement before the Clarke Inquiry.<br />
82Ibid., p. 33. French statement before the Clarke Inquiry.<br />
83Ibid., part 9, p. 4519, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. See also<br />
part 34, p. 21.<br />
84Ibid., part 33, p. 1282.<br />
85Ibid., p. 823. Marshall testimony before the NCI.