Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
The Morning of the Fateful Day 299 Stark concurred and asked Marshall to add a phrase to the eff ect “that the naval forces be also informed.” 67 “[T]o safeguard the codes,” messages to Army offi cers in the fi eld frequently included a request that the Navy be notifi ed, and vice versa. Since two similar coded cables containing essentially the same message made the task deciphering a code that much easier, Marshall and Stark “tried to avoid . . . both sending a message about the same things, to the various commanders concerned at Panama, Western Department, Hawaii, and the Philippines.” So Marshall penciled a short sentence at the bottom of his message, “Notify naval opposite.” 68 During their second conversation, Stark asked Marshall if he wouldn’t like to use the Navy’s more powerful transmitting facilities, its 25,000-kilowatt versus the Army’s 10,000-kilowatt radio station. 69 Th e Navy’s station had little diffi culty transmitting messages, while the Army’s was “normally out of service with Honolulu between 11 and 1:00.” 70 Atmospheric conditions over the Pacifi c at that time of the year were poor. Marshall declined Stark’s off er. Marshall’s handwritten message read, Japanese are presenting at 1:00 p.m., Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also, they are under orders to destroy their code machines immediately. Just what signifi - cance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication. 71 67 Ibid., part 34, p. 20. Bratton statement during Clarke Inquiry. 68 Ibid., part 33, p. 822. Marshall testimony before the NCI. See also Bratton testimony, ibid., part 9, p. 4541. Bratton said sending the same message in diff erent codes “jeopardized” code security. 69 Ibid., part 32, p.136. Stark testimony before the NCI. 70 Ibid., part 27, p. 114, Colonel French testimony before the APHB. 71 Ibid., part 14, p. 1334, Washington to Fort Shafter #529. See also ibid., part 15, p. 1640, Exhibit 61. Also ibid., part 3, p. 1112, Marshall testimony before the Joint Committee.
300 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Marshall gave his handwritten message to Bratton and told him “to take it to the Message Center and see that it was dispatched at once by the fastest safe means.” 72 When Bratton was about to leave, the question was raised as to whether Marshall’s message shouldn’t be typed. Because “time was an important factor,” however, Bratton was asked “to take it in its draft form to the Message Center.” As he was leaving, Gerow called out, “If there is any question of priority, give the Philippines fi rst priority.” Bratton took the message down the hall to the Army Message Center. As he handed it to Colonel Edward F. French, the signal offi cer in charge, Bratton said: “Th e Chief of Staff wants this sent at once by the fastest safe means.” 73 French found the penciled message “rather diffi cult to read;” 74 neither he nor his clerk could interpret Marshall’s handwriting. So French asked Bratton to “help [him] get this into readable script.” Bratton dictated it to a code-room typist, which took perhaps a minute, then “verifi ed and authenticated the message” 75 and put it into code. According to Bratton, it was then about 11:58 a.m. 76 French started processing the message immediately, “giving the Philippines fi rst priority.” 77 He went to the Signal Center himself and had the operator check the channel to Honolulu. Due to atmospheric conditions, Honolulu had been out of contact since about 10:20 that morning. 78 Transmitting the message to Honolulu via Army facilities would not only have slowed it down, but would have run a risk of garbling when it was copied 72Ibid., part 9, p. 4519, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 73Ibid. 74Ibid., part 34, p. 32, French statement before the Clarke Inquiry. 75Ibid., p. 33. 76Ibid., part 9, p. 4519, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. 77Ibid., part 34, p. 20, Bratton statement before the Clarke Inquiry. 78Ibid., part 27, p. 108, French testimony before the APHB.
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300 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />
Marshall gave his h<strong>and</strong>written message to Bratton <strong>and</strong> told him<br />
“to take it to the Message Center <strong>and</strong> see that it was dispatched<br />
at once by the fastest safe means.” 72<br />
When Bratton was about to leave, the question was raised as<br />
to whether Marshall’s message shouldn’t be typed. Because “time<br />
was an important factor,” however, Bratton was asked “to take<br />
it in its draft form to the Message Center.” As he was leaving,<br />
Gerow called out, “If there is any question <strong>of</strong> priority, give the<br />
Philippines fi rst priority.” Bratton took the message down the<br />
hall to the Army Message Center. As he h<strong>and</strong>ed it to Colonel<br />
Edward F. French, the signal <strong>of</strong>fi cer in charge, Bratton said: “Th e<br />
Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff wants this sent at once by the fastest safe means.” 73<br />
French found the penciled message “rather diffi cult to read;” 74<br />
neither he nor his clerk could interpret Marshall’s h<strong>and</strong>writing.<br />
So French asked Bratton to “help [him] get this into readable<br />
script.” Bratton dictated it to a code-room typist, which took perhaps<br />
a minute, then “verifi ed <strong>and</strong> authenticated the message” 75<br />
<strong>and</strong> put it into code. According to Bratton, it was then about<br />
11:58 a.m. 76<br />
French started processing the message immediately, “giving<br />
the Philippines fi rst priority.” 77 He went to the Signal Center<br />
himself <strong>and</strong> had the operator check the channel to Honolulu.<br />
Due to atmospheric conditions, Honolulu had been out <strong>of</strong> contact<br />
since about 10:20 that morning. 78 Transmitting the message<br />
to Honolulu via Army facilities would not only have slowed it<br />
down, but would have run a risk <strong>of</strong> garbling when it was copied<br />
72Ibid., part 9, p. 4519, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.<br />
73Ibid. 74Ibid., part 34, p. 32, French statement before the Clarke Inquiry.<br />
75Ibid., p. 33.<br />
76Ibid., part 9, p. 4519, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.<br />
77Ibid., part 34, p. 20, Bratton statement before the Clarke Inquiry.<br />
78Ibid., part 27, p. 108, French testimony before the APHB.
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