Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Morning of the Fateful Day 299
Stark concurred and asked Marshall to add a phrase to the eff ect
“that the naval forces be also informed.” 67
“[T]o safeguard the codes,” messages to Army offi cers in the
fi eld frequently included a request that the Navy be notifi ed, and
vice versa. Since two similar coded cables containing essentially
the same message made the task deciphering a code that much
easier, Marshall and Stark “tried to avoid . . . both sending a message
about the same things, to the various commanders concerned
at Panama, Western Department, Hawaii, and the Philippines.”
So Marshall penciled a short sentence at the bottom of his message,
“Notify naval opposite.” 68
During their second conversation, Stark asked Marshall if
he wouldn’t like to use the Navy’s more powerful transmitting
facilities, its 25,000-kilowatt versus the Army’s 10,000-kilowatt
radio station. 69 Th e Navy’s station had little diffi culty transmitting
messages, while the Army’s was “normally out of service with
Honolulu between 11 and 1:00.” 70 Atmospheric conditions over
the Pacifi c at that time of the year were poor. Marshall declined
Stark’s off er.
Marshall’s handwritten message read,
Japanese are presenting at 1:00 p.m., Eastern Standard Time
today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also, they are under orders
to destroy their code machines immediately. Just what signifi -
cance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert
accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication. 71
67 Ibid., part 34, p. 20. Bratton statement during Clarke Inquiry.
68 Ibid., part 33, p. 822. Marshall testimony before the NCI. See also Bratton
testimony, ibid., part 9, p. 4541. Bratton said sending the same message in
diff erent codes “jeopardized” code security.
69 Ibid., part 32, p.136. Stark testimony before the NCI.
70 Ibid., part 27, p. 114, Colonel French testimony before the APHB.
71 Ibid., part 14, p. 1334, Washington to Fort Shafter #529. See also ibid., part
15, p. 1640, Exhibit 61. Also ibid., part 3, p. 1112, Marshall testimony before
the Joint Committee.