Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

298 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o’clock that afternoon,
Washington time, and that they, the Commanders in the
areas indicated, should be on the alert.” 60
After the men had all
concurred in urging that our outlying possessions be given an
additional alert at once by the fastest possible means, Marshall
drew a piece of scratch paper toward him and picked up a
pencil and wrote out in longhand a message to be sent to our
overseas commanders. When he reached the bottom of the
page he picked up the telephone and called the Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Stark. . . . General Marshall, in a guarded
way, told Admiral Stark what he had in front of him and . . .
that he was going to send a warning to Hawaii, Panama, and
the Philippines and so on. 61
After some conversation with Stark, Marshall put down the
phone and said: “Admiral Stark doesn’t think that any additional
warning is necessary.” 62 Stark said that “all the forces had already
been several times alerted,” 63 they had “sent so much” 64 that
he “feared that that [another warning] would tend to confuse
them.” 65 More discussion. Marshall again phoned Stark. 66 He
read Stark the message he had just written. Th is time apparently
60Ibid., part 29, p. 2346. Bratton testimony before the APHB. Also ibid., part
34, pp. 19–20. Bratton testimony at Clarke Investigation.
61Ibid., part 9, p. 4518. Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
62Ibid. 63Ibid., part 34, p. 20. Bratton statement during Clarke Inquiry.
64Ibid., part 32, p. 136. Stark testimony before the NCI.
65Ibid., part 3, p. 1111. Marshall testimony before the Joint Committee.
66Ibid. Th e record of phone calls through the White House switchboard on
the morning of December 7, 1941, lists two a.m. calls by Marshall to Stark 10
minutes apart, 11:30 and 11.40.