Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Morning of the Fateful Day 297
“One p.m. Message” Spurs Action—Finally!
When Bratton and Miles walked into Marshall’s offi ce,
Marshall “had this 14-part message arranged in a book in front
of him” and “was reading the 14 parts.” Since Bratton and Miles
were both concerned about the deadline implied in the “One P.m.
Message,” they “attempted to interrupt General Marshall to get
him to read this One p.m. message.” 57 But Marshall continued
reading the fairly lengthy 14-part message, re-reading parts of it,
and refl ecting on it, which took a while, even though Marshall
said he read “much more rapidly than the average man.” 58
When Marshall had fi nally fi nished, Bratton handed him
the short “One p.m. Message,” which Bratton had been trying to
deliver to Marshall since about 9:00 a.m. Only then did Marshall
read it. He then “asked General Miles and [Bratton] what [they]
thought it meant.” Both men were
convinced it meant Japanese hostile action against some
American installation in the Pacifi c at or shortly after 1:00 that
afternoon. At about this time General Gerow and General
Bundy came into the room and there was some discussion of
the 14 parts, which were then regarded in the light of an ultimatum,
and of the One p.m. delivery message. 59
Marshall asked each of the men in turn, starting with Miles,
“for an evaluation of the situation.” Th ey thought it
probable that the Japanese line of action would be into
Th ailand but that it might be into any one or more of a number
of other areas. Miles urged that the Philippines, Hawaii,
Panama, and the West Coast be informed immediately that
57Ibid., part 9, p. 4518, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
58Ibid., part 33, p. 827, Marshall testimony at NCI.
59Ibid., part 29, p. 2346, Bratton testimony at APHB. See also ibid., part 34,
pp. 19–20, Bratton testimony at Clarke Investigation.