Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Morning of the Fateful Day 295
It was then “about 9:00 or shortly before.” Bratton was
immediately stunned . . . into frenzied activity because of its
implications and from that time on [he] was busily engaged
trying to locate various offi cers of the General Staff and conferring
with them on the exclusive subject of this message and
its meaning. 46
He “washed [his] hands of all other matters, turning them
over to [his] assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, and proceeded to take
steps with the 1:00 p.m. delivery message.” 47
Bratton could not locate in their offi ces any of the generals
for whom he was looking. He phoned Marshall’s quarters at
Fort Myer. Marshall had three orderlies, one of whom was always
on duty when Marshall was out—“to answer the telephone, to
be there until [Marshall] got back.” 48 When Bratton phoned
that morning, “[o]ne of his orderlies answered the telephone
and informed [Bratton] that the General had gone horseback
riding.” 49
“Well,” Bratton said, “you know generally where he has gone.
You know where you can get ahold of him?”
“Yes, I think I can fi nd him.”
“Please go out at once,” Bratton continued,
get assistance if necessary, and fi nd General Marshall, ask him
to—tell him who I am and tell him to go to the nearest telephone,
that it is vitally important that I communicate with him
at the earliest practicable moment.
Th e orderly said “he would do so.” 50
46Ibid., part 9, p. 4517, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
47Ibid., p. 4524.
48Ibid., part 3, p. 1430, Marshall testimony before the Joint Committee.
49Ibid., part 9, p. 4524, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
50 Ibid.