Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

294 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
of Military Intelligence. He went at once to his offi ce in G-2.
Deane proceeded to his offi ce in the Munitions Building, right
across the hall from the offi ce of Army Chief of Staff Marshall.
Because of the furor created nationwide by the Chicago
Tribune’s publication on December 4 of the secret U.S. war plans,
Congress had called on our top military offi cials to answer some
questions. Marshall was scheduled to testify on December 8, 41 and
he had asked Deane to compile a one-page summary statement
on the number of planes, antiaircraft guns, etc., in the United
States, together with basic information on the war plans. FDR
had also asked Marshall to have this information available, all on
a single sheet, when he came to the meeting the president had
called for 3:00 p.m. Sunday. 42 Th at was why Deane went into his
offi ce early. 43
Prior to December 7 there was no offi cer on duty around the
clock in the offi ce of the Army’s chief of staff , no 24-hour per day
duty offi cer (D.O.), so his offi ce was not offi cially open. However,
Deane opened his offi ce in the Munitions Building. 44
As soon as Bratton reached his offi ce in G-2, he received the
“One p.m. Message” from the Navy Department. It was “immediately
apparent” to Bratton that this message
was of such importance that it ought to be communicated to
the Chief of Staff [Marshall], the A.C. of S. [assistant chief
of staff military intelligence, Miles], and Chief of WPD [war
plans chief, Gerow] with the least practicable delay. 45
41Ibid. 42Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942 (New
York: Viking Press, 1965), p. 221.
43Deane interview.
44Ibid. 45Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, p. 2346, Bratton testimony at
APHB.