Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Morning of the Fateful Day 293
times to the Secretary.” Th e offi cer then “took the folder into Mr.
Knox, together with [Kramer’s] remarks.” 37
Kramer proceeded across the street to the White House
for his second delivery that morning. Kramer handed the new
intercepts to a senior assistant to Beardall, possibly Lieutenant
Commander Leahy. 38
When Kramer returned to the Navy Department this time—
at about 12:30—he discovered that, in his haste to translate the
circular message containing code words, so as to be able to deliver
it along with the “One p.m. Message” and the other Japanese intercepts,
he had failed to note an important code word, “minami,”
meaning “United States.” Th us the sentence he had translated as
“Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with
expectations” was wrong; it should have read, “Relations between
Japan, and England and the United States are not in accordance
with expectations.” Kramer made a few phone calls, but it was
lunchtime and he found his recipients scattered. No re-translation
was made and delivered, as was usual when messages were
garbled or misinterpreted. Th at afternoon, after the attack had
occurred, Kramer realized it would be pointless to send out a corrected
translation. 39
Delivery of “One p.m. Message”
to Army Personnel
Th e Army courier, Colonel Bratton, drove into Washington at
about 9:00 a.m. on Sunday morning, December 7, with Colonel
John R. Deane. 40 Bratton was in charge of the Far Eastern section
37 Ibid., part 33, pp. 859–60, Kramer testimony at NCI.
38 Ibid., part, 33, p. 865, Kramer testimony at NCI.
39 Ibid., part 36, pp. 82–83, Kramer testimony at Hewitt Inquiry. Also ibid., part
9, pp. 4071–73, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See Friedman
testimony at Hewitt Inquiry (ibid., part 36, p. 308).
40 John R. Deane interview, January 2, 1964, by the author.