Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

292 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
ambassadors, we felt that there were important things which
would move at that time.” 32
Stark “immediately called the White House on the telephone.” 33
McCollum thought Stark also phoned Marshall. 34 Th ere was
considerable coming and going; not everyone was there all the
time. 35 Th ere is no record of what these top naval offi cers talked
about in Stark’s offi ce that morning in the light of the crucial
intercepts they had just received. In any event, no special notice
or advice of impending confl ict was sent out by CNO Stark to
the fi eld commanders.
Delivery of “One p.m. Message”
to State Department
Kramer was anxious to get to the State Department before
the Hull-Knox-Stimson meeting broke up. 36 When he, Kramer,
arrived at Hull’s offi ce with the “One pm. Message,” he talked,
not with Hull, but with “a State Department Foreign Service
Offi cer who regularly handled this material for Mr. Hull.” He
explained the importance of the material he was delivering and
pointed out that “the directive for delivery of the Japanese note
at 1300 was a time which was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor and was a
few hours before sunrise at Kota Bharu [British Malaya].” In
talking with the foreign service offi cer, Kramer “made a point of
. . . inviting the attention of Mr. Knox to the times involved.” He
thought “that Mr. Knox, being a civilian, even though Secretary
of Navy, might not have seen at fi rst glance the implications of
the times.” So he “simply pointed out the coincidence of those
32Ibid., pp. 25–26.
33Ibid. 34Ibid., p. 27.
35Ibid., p. 26.
36Ibid., part 9, p. 4052. Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.