Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Morning of the Fateful Day 291
Th erefore, Kramer “dictated on [his] feet while the book concerning
the 1:00 delivery and other late urgent messages was being
made up.” 28 His translation of the crucial sentence in this cable
read: “Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance
with expectation.” 29 Kramer delivered this new material,
including the “One p.m. Message,” “within ten to fi fteen minutes
to Admiral Stark’s offi ce” in the Navy Department building. 30
Stark’s meeting was still going on, so Kramer sent word in that
he had something more of importance. According to McCollum,
he
held a short discussion with Lieutenant Commander Kramer
as to the signifi cance at [sic] the [1 p.m. delivery] time, and he
it was who pointed out the times at Honolulu as 7:30 and in
the Far East as dawn, and so on. 31
McCollum took the “One p.m. Message” in to Stark. Th e signifi
cance of the 1:00 p.m. delivery time was discussed. McCollum
pointed out that
1:00 p.m. Washington time would mean about 8:00 in the
morning Honolulu time . . . 7:30 . . . very early in the morning
out in the Far East, that is, out in the Philippines and those
places . . . we didn’t know what this signifi ed, but that if an
attack were coming, it looked like . . . it was timed for operations
out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii.
Th ere was no way of knowing just where the Japanese might
strike, but, McCollum reasoned, “because of the fact that the
exact time for delivery of this note had been stressed to the
28 Ibid., part 36, p. 343, Kramer testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
29 Ibid., part 36, pp. 82–83, 343, Kramer testimony at Hewitt Inquiry. See also
part 9, pp. 4071, 4073, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.
30 Ibid., part 33, p. 859, Kramer testimony at NCI.
31 Ibid., part 36, p. 27, McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.