Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

290 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
directed fi nal destruction of Japanese codes still on hand. . . .
Th ere was another message thanking the ambassador for his
services, another addressed to the embassy staff , and one or two
others of like nature. 24
A fourth intercept was a circular telegram addressed to
Japanese diplomatic offi ces around the world concerning relations
between Japan and England. 25 Th ese new messages made it
obvious that the Japanese government was giving up all thought
of negotiating further with the U.S. government, breaking relations
with England, winding down its operations in Washington,
and abandoning the embassy staff to their own devices.
Because the circular telegram closed with the telltale English
word “STOP” instead of the usual Japanese “OWARI,” Kramer
realized it was an emergency dispatch containing code words. Th e
Tokyo-Washington Circular #2409, containing the setup for this
message and defi ning the hidden meanings of the code words,
had been translated by the Navy on December 2. 26 Presumably
it was distributed to the usual recipients of MAGIC, but it was
not a subject on which witnesses were questioned during the
hearings. Despite the urgency to deliver the “One p.m. Message”
promptly, Kramer thought
that delay to get this one [the circular intercept] into that folder
was warranted; otherwise delivery probably wouldn’t have been
made until after noon since the meetings then in progress at
the State Department and in CNO’s offi ce would probably
have been adjourned and the recipients not accessible, out to
lunch or one thing and another. 27
24Ibid., part 33, p. 859, Kramer testimony at NCI. For intercepts referred to,
see ibid., part 12, pp. 248–49.
25Ibid., part 12, p. 251.
26Ibid., pp. 186–87, part 37, pp. 665–66, and part 36, p. 77.
27Ibid., part 36, pp. 344, Kramer testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.