Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
The Morning of the Fateful Day 287 in Hawaii, further reinforcing Kimmel’s impression that it was southeast Asia that was threatened by Japanese attack. Under our Constitution the only justifi cation for having U.S. military outposts is to protect U.S. citizens and U.S. interests within and around our national borders. Yet Hart was being told by our naval observer in Singapore that the U.S. government had agreed to go to the aid—not of U.S. territory or U.S. citizens— but of British military forces should they decide to take action against Japanese soldiers landing in Th ailand, the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, or Singapore. President Roosevelt had apparently committed U.S. forces to helping the British thousands of miles from any U.S. territory. Th is was news to our top naval commander in the Far East. Part 14 of Japan’s Reply Delivered to Navy Personnel Th is particular Sunday morning, anticipating he would have to deliver some messages earlier than usual, Navy courier Kramer went in to the Navy Department at about 7:30. 12 According to offi cial records, both part 14 of the Japanese reply and the “One p.m. Message” were available before Kramer reached the department. 13 However, when Kramer set out on his fi rst delivery trip of the day, the “One p.m. Message,” which required translation, was apparently not included in his locked pouch. With the receipt of part 14, the text of the Japanese government’s reply to our note of November 26 was complete, so Kramer left on his rounds. Kramer’s fi rst delivery that morning at about 8:00 a.m. was to the Navy Department, to Commander McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section, Navy Intelligence. Kramer soon left McCollum’s offi ce, but returned very shortly with a copy of the entire 14-part 12 Ibid., part 33, pp. 858–59, Kramer testimony at NCI, September 13, 1944. 13 Ibid., part 33, p. 803, Pering testimony.
288 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy message for McCollum’s boss, Rear Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, who had just arrived. Wilkinson sent for McCollum and for 15 or 20 minutes the two men discussed the Far East situation. Th en they heard that Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, had arrived in the Navy Department—it was quite unusual for Stark to come in to the offi ce that early on a Sunday morning 14 and they went down to talk with him. When Kramer arrived at Stark’s offi ce with the 14 parts together with the other new material, it was “about 9:00 Sunday morning, or possibly earlier, nearer 8:30.” Wilkinson and McCollum were there discussing the situation with Stark. 15 McCollum stepped out of the offi ce for a moment and was handed “the fi nal note to be delivered on the United States by the Japanese ambassadors.” 16 Other Navy offi cers of the Division of Operations began to appear in Stark’s offi ce—Admirals Ingersoll, Brainard, Noyes, and Turner, possibly Captain Schuirmann also, as well as a few others. All joined in the discussion. McCollum himself “was in and out of Stark’s offi ce at about 0900 or 0930” and “on one of his entries into Admiral Stark’s offi ce [he] met General Marshall coming out of the offi ce . . . accompanied by his aide,” Colonel Bratton. 17 Kramer left to continue on to the State Department, anxious to arrive before 10:00 a.m., when Secretary of Navy Knox’s meeting 14Ibid., part 8, p. 3905, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See also part 33, p. 869. 15Ibid., part 36, p. 25. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. 16Ibid., p. 26. 17Ibid., p. 27. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. See also this author’s interviews of McCollum (May 18, 1945, with Admiral Kimmel and Kimmel’s attorneys, Charles Rugg and Captain Robert A. Lavender; and May 3, 1961, at the Army and Navy Club, Washington, D.C., with Admirals Samuel Morison, Walter DeLany, John Shafroth, also Dr. Charles Tansill, and Mrs. Wohlstetter present).
- Page 260: Signifi cant Information Known in W
- Page 263 and 264: 240 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 265 and 266: 242 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 267 and 268: 244 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 269 and 270: 246 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 272 and 273: 12. December 6, Part 1 Collecting
- Page 274 and 275: December 6, Part 1 251 usually in t
- Page 276 and 277: December 6, Part 1 253 result of th
- Page 278 and 279: December 6, Part 1 255 Message.”
- Page 280 and 281: December 6, Part 1 257 Fleet in the
- Page 282 and 283: December 6, Part 1 259 Takagi, Ando
- Page 284 and 285: December 6, Part 1 261 fully apprec
- Page 286 and 287: December 6, Part 1 263 included all
- Page 288 and 289: December 6, Part 1 265 told him tha
- Page 290: December 6, Part 1 267 had “now r
- Page 293 and 294: 270 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 295 and 296: 272 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 297 and 298: 274 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 299 and 300: 276 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 301 and 302: 278 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 303 and 304: 280 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 305 and 306: 282 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 307 and 308: 284 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 309: 286 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 313 and 314: 290 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 315 and 316: 292 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 317 and 318: 294 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 319 and 320: 296 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 321 and 322: 298 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 323 and 324: 300 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 325 and 326: 302 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 327 and 328: 304 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 329 and 330: 306 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 331 and 332: 308 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 334 and 335: 15. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is
- Page 336 and 337: Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No
- Page 338 and 339: Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No
- Page 340 and 341: Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No
- Page 342 and 343: Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No
- Page 344 and 345: Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No
- Page 346 and 347: Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No
- Page 348 and 349: Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No
- Page 350 and 351: Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No
- Page 352 and 353: Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No
- Page 354 and 355: Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No
- Page 356 and 357: Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No
- Page 358 and 359: Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No
288 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />
message for McCollum’s boss, Rear Admiral Wilkinson, Director<br />
<strong>of</strong> Naval Intelligence, who had just arrived. Wilkinson sent for<br />
McCollum <strong>and</strong> for 15 or 20 minutes the two men discussed the<br />
Far East situation. Th en they heard that Admiral Stark, Chief <strong>of</strong><br />
Naval Operations, had arrived in the Navy Department—it was<br />
quite unusual for Stark to come in to the <strong>of</strong>fi ce that early on a<br />
Sunday morning 14 <strong>and</strong> they went down to talk with him.<br />
When Kramer arrived at Stark’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce with the 14 parts<br />
together with the other new material, it was “about 9:00 Sunday<br />
morning, or possibly earlier, nearer 8:30.” Wilkinson <strong>and</strong><br />
McCollum were there discussing the situation with Stark. 15<br />
McCollum stepped out <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fi ce for a moment <strong>and</strong> was<br />
h<strong>and</strong>ed “the fi nal note to be delivered on the United States by<br />
the Japanese ambassadors.” 16<br />
Other Navy <strong>of</strong>fi cers <strong>of</strong> the Division <strong>of</strong> Operations began to<br />
appear in Stark’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce—Admirals Ingersoll, Brainard, Noyes, <strong>and</strong><br />
Turner, possibly Captain Schuirmann also, as well as a few others.<br />
All joined in the discussion. McCollum himself “was in <strong>and</strong> out<br />
<strong>of</strong> Stark’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce at about 0900 or 0930” <strong>and</strong> “on one <strong>of</strong> his entries<br />
into Admiral Stark’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce [he] met General Marshall coming<br />
out <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fi ce . . . accompanied by his aide,” Colonel Bratton. 17<br />
Kramer left to continue on to the State Department, anxious to<br />
arrive before 10:00 a.m., when Secretary <strong>of</strong> Navy Knox’s meeting<br />
14Ibid., part 8, p. 3905, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See also<br />
part 33, p. 869.<br />
15Ibid., part 36, p. 25. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.<br />
16Ibid., p. 26.<br />
17Ibid., p. 27. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. See also this<br />
author’s interviews <strong>of</strong> McCollum (May 18, 1945, with Admiral Kimmel <strong>and</strong><br />
Kimmel’s attorneys, Charles Rugg <strong>and</strong> Captain Robert A. Lavender; <strong>and</strong><br />
May 3, 1961, at the Army <strong>and</strong> Navy Club, Washington, D.C., with Admirals<br />
Samuel Morison, Walter DeLany, John Shafroth, also Dr. Charles Tansill, <strong>and</strong><br />
Mrs. Wohlstetter present).