Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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The Morning of the Fateful Day 287 in Hawaii, further reinforcing Kimmel’s impression that it was southeast Asia that was threatened by Japanese attack. Under our Constitution the only justifi cation for having U.S. military outposts is to protect U.S. citizens and U.S. interests within and around our national borders. Yet Hart was being told by our naval observer in Singapore that the U.S. government had agreed to go to the aid—not of U.S. territory or U.S. citizens— but of British military forces should they decide to take action against Japanese soldiers landing in Th ailand, the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, or Singapore. President Roosevelt had apparently committed U.S. forces to helping the British thousands of miles from any U.S. territory. Th is was news to our top naval commander in the Far East. Part 14 of Japan’s Reply Delivered to Navy Personnel Th is particular Sunday morning, anticipating he would have to deliver some messages earlier than usual, Navy courier Kramer went in to the Navy Department at about 7:30. 12 According to offi cial records, both part 14 of the Japanese reply and the “One p.m. Message” were available before Kramer reached the department. 13 However, when Kramer set out on his fi rst delivery trip of the day, the “One p.m. Message,” which required translation, was apparently not included in his locked pouch. With the receipt of part 14, the text of the Japanese government’s reply to our note of November 26 was complete, so Kramer left on his rounds. Kramer’s fi rst delivery that morning at about 8:00 a.m. was to the Navy Department, to Commander McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section, Navy Intelligence. Kramer soon left McCollum’s offi ce, but returned very shortly with a copy of the entire 14-part 12 Ibid., part 33, pp. 858–59, Kramer testimony at NCI, September 13, 1944. 13 Ibid., part 33, p. 803, Pering testimony.

288 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy message for McCollum’s boss, Rear Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, who had just arrived. Wilkinson sent for McCollum and for 15 or 20 minutes the two men discussed the Far East situation. Th en they heard that Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, had arrived in the Navy Department—it was quite unusual for Stark to come in to the offi ce that early on a Sunday morning 14 and they went down to talk with him. When Kramer arrived at Stark’s offi ce with the 14 parts together with the other new material, it was “about 9:00 Sunday morning, or possibly earlier, nearer 8:30.” Wilkinson and McCollum were there discussing the situation with Stark. 15 McCollum stepped out of the offi ce for a moment and was handed “the fi nal note to be delivered on the United States by the Japanese ambassadors.” 16 Other Navy offi cers of the Division of Operations began to appear in Stark’s offi ce—Admirals Ingersoll, Brainard, Noyes, and Turner, possibly Captain Schuirmann also, as well as a few others. All joined in the discussion. McCollum himself “was in and out of Stark’s offi ce at about 0900 or 0930” and “on one of his entries into Admiral Stark’s offi ce [he] met General Marshall coming out of the offi ce . . . accompanied by his aide,” Colonel Bratton. 17 Kramer left to continue on to the State Department, anxious to arrive before 10:00 a.m., when Secretary of Navy Knox’s meeting 14Ibid., part 8, p. 3905, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See also part 33, p. 869. 15Ibid., part 36, p. 25. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. 16Ibid., p. 26. 17Ibid., p. 27. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. See also this author’s interviews of McCollum (May 18, 1945, with Admiral Kimmel and Kimmel’s attorneys, Charles Rugg and Captain Robert A. Lavender; and May 3, 1961, at the Army and Navy Club, Washington, D.C., with Admirals Samuel Morison, Walter DeLany, John Shafroth, also Dr. Charles Tansill, and Mrs. Wohlstetter present).

288 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

message for McCollum’s boss, Rear Admiral Wilkinson, Director<br />

<strong>of</strong> Naval Intelligence, who had just arrived. Wilkinson sent for<br />

McCollum <strong>and</strong> for 15 or 20 minutes the two men discussed the<br />

Far East situation. Th en they heard that Admiral Stark, Chief <strong>of</strong><br />

Naval Operations, had arrived in the Navy Department—it was<br />

quite unusual for Stark to come in to the <strong>of</strong>fi ce that early on a<br />

Sunday morning 14 <strong>and</strong> they went down to talk with him.<br />

When Kramer arrived at Stark’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce with the 14 parts<br />

together with the other new material, it was “about 9:00 Sunday<br />

morning, or possibly earlier, nearer 8:30.” Wilkinson <strong>and</strong><br />

McCollum were there discussing the situation with Stark. 15<br />

McCollum stepped out <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fi ce for a moment <strong>and</strong> was<br />

h<strong>and</strong>ed “the fi nal note to be delivered on the United States by<br />

the Japanese ambassadors.” 16<br />

Other Navy <strong>of</strong>fi cers <strong>of</strong> the Division <strong>of</strong> Operations began to<br />

appear in Stark’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce—Admirals Ingersoll, Brainard, Noyes, <strong>and</strong><br />

Turner, possibly Captain Schuirmann also, as well as a few others.<br />

All joined in the discussion. McCollum himself “was in <strong>and</strong> out<br />

<strong>of</strong> Stark’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce at about 0900 or 0930” <strong>and</strong> “on one <strong>of</strong> his entries<br />

into Admiral Stark’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce [he] met General Marshall coming<br />

out <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fi ce . . . accompanied by his aide,” Colonel Bratton. 17<br />

Kramer left to continue on to the State Department, anxious to<br />

arrive before 10:00 a.m., when Secretary <strong>of</strong> Navy Knox’s meeting<br />

14Ibid., part 8, p. 3905, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See also<br />

part 33, p. 869.<br />

15Ibid., part 36, p. 25. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.<br />

16Ibid., p. 26.<br />

17Ibid., p. 27. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. See also this<br />

author’s interviews <strong>of</strong> McCollum (May 18, 1945, with Admiral Kimmel <strong>and</strong><br />

Kimmel’s attorneys, Charles Rugg <strong>and</strong> Captain Robert A. Lavender; <strong>and</strong><br />

May 3, 1961, at the Army <strong>and</strong> Navy Club, Washington, D.C., with Admirals<br />

Samuel Morison, Walter DeLany, John Shafroth, also Dr. Charles Tansill, <strong>and</strong><br />

Mrs. Wohlstetter present).

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