Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Morning of the Fateful Day 287
in Hawaii, further reinforcing Kimmel’s impression that it was
southeast Asia that was threatened by Japanese attack.
Under our Constitution the only justifi cation for having U.S.
military outposts is to protect U.S. citizens and U.S. interests
within and around our national borders. Yet Hart was being told
by our naval observer in Singapore that the U.S. government had
agreed to go to the aid—not of U.S. territory or U.S. citizens—
but of British military forces should they decide to take action
against Japanese soldiers landing in Th ailand, the Dutch East
Indies, British Malaya, or Singapore. President Roosevelt had
apparently committed U.S. forces to helping the British thousands
of miles from any U.S. territory. Th is was news to our top
naval commander in the Far East.
Part 14 of Japan’s Reply
Delivered to Navy Personnel
Th is particular Sunday morning, anticipating he would have
to deliver some messages earlier than usual, Navy courier Kramer
went in to the Navy Department at about 7:30. 12 According to
offi cial records, both part 14 of the Japanese reply and the “One
p.m. Message” were available before Kramer reached the department.
13 However, when Kramer set out on his fi rst delivery trip of
the day, the “One p.m. Message,” which required translation, was
apparently not included in his locked pouch. With the receipt of
part 14, the text of the Japanese government’s reply to our note of
November 26 was complete, so Kramer left on his rounds.
Kramer’s fi rst delivery that morning at about 8:00 a.m. was to
the Navy Department, to Commander McCollum, head of the Far
Eastern Section, Navy Intelligence. Kramer soon left McCollum’s
offi ce, but returned very shortly with a copy of the entire 14-part
12 Ibid., part 33, pp. 858–59, Kramer testimony at NCI, September 13, 1944.
13 Ibid., part 33, p. 803, Pering testimony.