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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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8 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

Official U.S. Foreign Policy<br />

During the 1930s, U.S. opinion opposed involvement in foreign<br />

wars. Congress responded in 1935 by passing neutrality legislation<br />

prohibiting trade in arms or implements <strong>of</strong> war with any<br />

belligerent nation. As FDR signed this legislation (S.J. Resolution<br />

173) on August 31, 1935, he explained that “it was intended as an<br />

expression <strong>of</strong> the fi xed desire <strong>of</strong> the Government <strong>and</strong> the people<br />

<strong>of</strong> the United States to avoid any action which might involve us<br />

in war.” “Th e purpose,” he said, “is wholly excellent.” Emphasizing<br />

U.S. neutrality in international confl icts still more emphatically,<br />

Roosevelt added: “Th e policy <strong>of</strong> the Government is defi nitely<br />

committed to the maintenance <strong>of</strong> peace <strong>and</strong> the avoidance <strong>of</strong> any<br />

entanglements which would lead us into confl ict.” 3<br />

In spite <strong>of</strong> FDR’s pr<strong>of</strong>essed neutrality, however, he was apparently<br />

already considering the possibility <strong>of</strong> confl ict with Japan.<br />

Th e Offi ce <strong>of</strong> Naval Intelligence (ONI) whose duty it was to collect<br />

<strong>and</strong> analyze pertinent information for the Navy, was then<br />

assembling material about potential Japanese <strong>and</strong> communist<br />

espionage agents. For instance, the ONI “carded” Japanese residents<br />

in the New York area for use in “corralling the individuals<br />

for internment or breaking down any system <strong>of</strong> espionage or sabotage”<br />

in the event <strong>of</strong> a confl ict. 4 In an August 10, 1936, memor<strong>and</strong>um<br />

to Chief <strong>of</strong> Naval Operations Admiral William D. Leahy,<br />

FDR sanctioned this operation. He “expressed his support . . . for<br />

locating all Japanese for possible incarceration in a ‘concentration<br />

camp’ during a crisis.” 5<br />

FDR was a charming, charismatic, <strong>and</strong> convincing speaker.<br />

From 1935, when he signed the Neutrality Act, until the attack<br />

3 Roosevelt, Th e Public Papers <strong>and</strong> Addresses, 1935, vol. 4, pp. 345–46.<br />

4 Jeffrey M. Dorwart, Confl ict <strong>of</strong> Duty: <strong>The</strong> U.S. Navy’s Intelligence Dilemma,<br />

1919–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 65.<br />

5 Roosevelt, August 10, 1936 memor<strong>and</strong>um to Chief <strong>of</strong> Naval Operations,<br />

Admiral William D. Leahy. Quoted in Dorwart, Confl ict <strong>of</strong> Duty, p. 65.

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