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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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286 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

In spite <strong>of</strong> Hart’s willingness to cooperate with the British,<br />

he was startled by the news he received just after Phillips’s departure<br />

from U.S. Naval Observer John M. Creighton in Singapore.<br />

Creighton reported that Brooke-Popham, comm<strong>and</strong>er <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Royal Air Force in Malaya <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the British Army Forces, had<br />

been advised on Saturday by the War Department in London that<br />

they had “now received assurance <strong>of</strong> American armed support” in<br />

three eventualities: (1) if the British were obliged to forestall a<br />

Japanese l<strong>and</strong>ing on the Isthmus <strong>of</strong> Kra, or on any other part<br />

<strong>of</strong> Siam, (2) if the Dutch Indies were attacked <strong>and</strong> the British<br />

went to their defense, or (3) if the Japanese attacked the British.<br />

Moreover London had advised Brooke-Popham that if he had<br />

reliable information that the Japanese were advancing with the<br />

apparent intention <strong>of</strong> l<strong>and</strong>ing on Kra or in Siam, he need not<br />

consult London to put his operation plan into action. London<br />

also advised him that the British-Dutch plan was to be put into<br />

operation if the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s East Indies was attacked. 10<br />

If the United States was committed to helping the British<br />

militarily in the event <strong>of</strong> a Japanese attack in southeast Asia, it<br />

could not be long before we would be asked to fulfi ll that promise.<br />

Th e immediacy <strong>of</strong> a possible call for U.S. “armed support”<br />

led Hart to wire Washington about Creighton’s report, saying he<br />

had “received no corresponding instructions.” 11 Hart’s message<br />

left Manila three-<strong>and</strong>-a-half hours after the one sent by Hart<br />

<strong>and</strong> Phillips jointly—6:45 a.m. GMT (2:45 p.m., December 7,<br />

Manila time, or 1:45 a.m. December 7 in Washington). It reached<br />

Washington during the night <strong>of</strong> December 6–7 but wasn’t<br />

decoded immediately. An information copy went to Kimmel<br />

10 Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 10, pp. 5082–83. See Creighton<br />

(ALUSNA), Singapore telegram, December 6, 1941, to Admiral Hart in<br />

Manila, included in Creighton testimony before Joint Committee hearings.<br />

11 Ibid., part 14, p. 1412.

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