Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Morning of the Fateful Day 285
offi cials in Washington until the following morning. One of these
messages consisted of fi ve parts and was signed jointly by Hart
and by the British commander-in-chief, Eastern Fleet, Admiral
Tom S.V. Phillips. Th e other was a frantic plea from Hart for
advice from Washington; Hart had just learned of U.S. promises
to support the British militarily in the event of a Japanese strike
in southeast Asia.
Phillips had fl own from Singapore to Manila to meet Hart
and discuss with him “the problems with which we are faced in the
Far Eastern area.” Th eir joint cable was dispatched from Manila
at 3:27 a.m. Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), December 7 (10:27
p.m. December 6, Washington time) and received in Washington
about 11:00 p.m. on December 6. 8
Hart and Phillips had conferred about preparations for the
war with Japan they both anticipated. Th ey assumed that “the
initiative must inevitably rest with the Japanese.” Th e two commanders
considered it important to coordinate British and U.S.
operations, but they agreed that each would retain strategic control
of his own forces. Hart expected that his fl eet’s operations
would be in accordance with plan “Rainbow V,” the plan prepared
as the basis for U.S. off ensive operations, the same plan under
which Kimmel in Hawaii had been directed to operate. Th eir joint
message discussed the disposition to be made of British ships in
the Far East and recommended that Manila be made available as
a base for the British battle fl eet.
As soon as Phillips heard of the Japanese convoy setting out
for the Gulf of Siam from Camranh Bay, on the eastern coast of
French Indochina, he left Manila to return to Singapore. As he
was leaving, Hart told him that four of Hart’s destroyers then at
Borneo would soon be joining Phillips’s forces. 9
8Ibid., part 4, pp. 1933–35.
9Lionel Wigmore, Th e Japanese Th rust (Canberra: Australian War Memorial,
1957), p. 122.