Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

284 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through
further negotiations. 4
Th is strong language left little room for doubt as to Japan’s
intentions. According to Wilkinson, these were “fi ghting words.”
He was “more impressed by that language than by the breaking
off of negotiations, which of itself might be only temporary.
Th ose would be hard words to eat.” 5
Another message from Tokyo to the Japanese ambassadors
was also intercepted and teletyped from Bainbridge at the same
time as part 14. It was received in Washington during the watch
that ended at 7:00 a.m. Sunday morning, “passed to the Army
for translation by the Navy” and then received back in the Navy
“at about 7:15 a.m.” Th ere it was held for Commander Kramer,
the only person authorized to distribute translations to higher
authorities. 6 Th is message, in Japanese, specifi ed the precise
time—1:00 p.m. Washington time, December 7—at which the
ambassadors were to deliver their government’s 14-part reply to
the U.S. government. Th e ambassadors were to hand the Japanese
reply, “if possible,” directly to the secretary of state. Because of
the time specifi ed, this cable came to be known as the “One p.m.
Message.” 7
Admiral Hart (Manila) Inquires About
U.S. Commitments in Southeast Pacific
Two other important messages also arrived in Washington
during the night of December 6–7 from Admiral Hart in the
Philippines. However, as a result of the heavy intercept traffi c, they
were not decoded immediately and did not become available to our
4 Ibid., part 12, p. 245.
5 Ibid., part 4, p. 1766, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee.
6 Ibid., part 33, pp. 803–04. Testimony of Lt. Cmdr. Alfred V. Pering at NCI.
7 Ibid., part 12, p. 248.