Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Morning of the Fateful Day 283
assistance pact with Germany and Italy. Part 9 of Japan’s reply
was more infl ammatory; it asserted that the United States
may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war . . .
aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack . . . Germany and
Italy . . . and exercising . . . pressure [on Japan] by economic
power. 1
After seeing these 13 parts, the top administration, Army, and
Navy offi cials were anxious to learn the content of the 14th part.
Part 14 was picked up by Station S at Bainbridge Island on
the west coast on Sunday, December 7, at 3:05 a.m. Washington,
D.C. time and was in the hands of our decoders, still in code, in
Washington, D.C. by about 4:00. 2 Like the earlier 13 parts, it was
in English. It was decoded “completed and ready for delivery to
Commander Kramer at 7 a.m., December 7.” 3
In part 14, Japan charged that it was the
intention of the American Government to conspire with Great
Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s eff orts toward
the establishment of peace . . . by keeping Japan and China at
war.
Th erefore, Japan’s attempt “to preserve and promote the
peace of the Pacifi c through cooperation with the American
Government has fi nally been lost.” Th e Japanese government
regretted
to have to notify hereby the American Government that in
view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but
179th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 12, pp. 239–45, Tokyo to Washington
14-part #902.
2Ibid., part 14, p. 1415.
3Ibid., part 33, pp. 803–04.