Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

282 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Th e United States Navy, now in the midst of a record expansion
program and recently placed on a war footing with full
personnel manning the ships of three fl eets, has at this time no
superior in the world. . . . On any comparable basis, the United
States Navy is second to none.
Knox was “proud to report that the American people may feel
fully confi dent in their Navy.” In view of the uncertain international
situation,
Our aim must always be to have forces suffi cient to enable us to
have complete freedom of action in either ocean while retaining
forces in the other ocean for eff ective defense of our vital
security. Anything less than this strength is hazardous to the
security of the nation and must be considered as unacceptable
as long as it is within our power to produce and man the forces
necessary to meet these requirements.
In substance, the department’s report announced that the U.S.
Navy was “second to none” and that it was capable of operating
in both the Atlantic and Pacifi c. Moreover, it was being further
strengthened and expanded. Th us the public was assured on the
morning of December 7, 1941, that the U.S. Navy constituted an
eff ective and reliable arm of our national defense.
Part 14 of Japan’s Reply to U.S. Note
Th e 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our November 26 note,
received in Washington late on Saturday, December 6, were a
fairly sober review of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations to date and
the various points of agreement and disagreement—notably, the
economic restrictions imposed on Japan, the embargo, the freezing
of assets, the fact that the United States was assisting China,
and the United States’s determined insistence (a) that Japan
withdraw from China and (b) that she refuse to honor her mutual