Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

280 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
House that night must surely have speculated on how to respond
if the Japanese attacked the Isthmus of Kra in Malaya, Th ailand,
the Dutch East Indies, or British Singapore. What action should
the United States then take? What should FDR say to Congress?
Should we go to the aid of the British and Dutch militarily, as
FDR had promised British Ambassador Halifax? If we did, how
would FDR and his associates justify to the American people this
military intervention so far from the shores of continental United
States? On the other hand, if the U.S. did not give the British and
Dutch the “armed support” they had been promised, how would
the administration explain to them, and to the world, the failure
of our president to honor an agreement he had made?
With the crisis developing in southeast Asia, it looked as if
the United States was losing the opportunity to take the initiative
as Stimson had suggested a week earlier—namely to “maneuver
them [the Japanese] into the position of fi ring the fi rst shot without
allowing too much danger to ourselves.” Of course, it was
still possible that the three small vessels outfi tted, as FDR had
directed, as minimal U.S. men-of-war might get to sea before a
Japanese strike. If they did sail in time and arrive at the paths of
the Japanese convoys, they could still provoke an incident “without
too much danger to ourselves.” But events were crowding in
around us thick and fast.