Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

278 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world
that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to
Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable
doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing
concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.
. . . It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is
unthinkable.
In his message, the president sought to assure Japan that
“Th ere is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States
of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to
be withdrawn therefrom.”
He continued:
I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the
Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya
and the Government of Th ailand. I would even undertake to
ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of
China. Th us a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-
China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the
whole of the South Pacifi c area. 33
Roosevelt did not address Japan’s economic problems, which
had been aggravated by the U.S. embargoes barring her from
world markets. Nor did FDR refer to the decades-long Russianinspired
confl ict in Manchuria and China, the source of Japan’s
diffi culties on the Asian mainland. And he off ered no assurance
that he could, or would try to, keep the Chinese from stirring up
still more trouble. (By this time, the American taxpayers were
actually furnishing aid to the communist troublemakers in China
and the communist forces fi ghting against Germany in Europe.)
Th e message for Emperor Hirohito was transmitted in “our
nonconfi dential code at that time, the gray code, which was
33 Ibid.