Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

December 6, Part 2 277
it was an important document. . . . And that the Chief of Staff
should know about it.” Also to General Gerow’s executive offi -
cer, Colonel Gailey, 26 and to the night duty offi cer in the State
Department for delivery to Hull. 27
FDR Addresses Emperor Hirohito Directly
According to Hull, “On December 6, our Government
received from a number of sources reports of the movement of a
Japanese fl eet of 35 transports, 8 cruisers, and 20 destroyers from
Indochina toward the Kra Peninsula. . . . Th e critical character of
this development, which placed the United States and its friends
in common imminent danger, was very much in all our minds,
and was an important subject of my conference with representatives
of the Army and Navy on that and the following day.” 28
Sometime during the day, December 6, Hull drafted and
forwarded to the White House a message for FDR to send the
Japanese emperor. 29 Roosevelt had written a draft of his own
and preferred it. 30 After a few editorial changes by the State
Department, to which FDR agreed, he sent the revised version to
Hull with his handwritten “OK.” 31
In his note to the emperor the president said that recent
developments in the Pacifi c area “contain tragic possibilities.” 32
Th e president desired peace, he wrote, but
26 Ibid., p. 2421.
27 Ibid., part 9, p. 4514, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
28 Ibid., part 2, p. 441, Hull’s 1945 deposition to the Joint Committee.
29 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers,
1941, vol. 2: Th e Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Offi ce, 1956), vol. 4, pp. 722–23.
30 Ibid., pp. 723–25.
31 Ibid., p. 762n. Transmitted in Telegram No. 818, December 6, 9 p.m.
32 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Offi ce, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 784–86.