Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
U.S. International Policy: 1933–1940 7 support of the American people.” 2 Th e League of Nations investigated the “Manchurian incident” and issued a report blaming Japan. Japan and Britain disagreed with the League’s report. However, it was accepted and in 1933 Japan withdrew from the League. After the death in 1925 of Sun Yat-sen, revolutionary leader and president of the Southern Chinese Republic, Chiang Kaishek assumed the presidency. Chiang began trying to unite the country. Th e communists intervened, sometimes for, sometimes against, Chiang’s nationalist forces. Th ere was almost constant fi ghting by and among Chiang’s nationalists, the warlords, the Chinese communists and the Russian communists. When the Chinese boycotted Japanese textiles, the Japanese retaliated by bombarding and sending troops to the Shanghai International Settlement ( January 28–March 4, 1932). Many were killed. U.S. sympathy was with the Chinese; the Japanese were portrayed as the aggressors. After fi erce fi ghting, the Japanese retreated temporarily, and the boycott was brought to an end. Another time when Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist forces threatened Japan’s economic and industrial interests in Manchuria, Japan called up 5,000 troops to protect her merchants there. Th e Russian Communists and the Chinese Communists were both heavily involved. Finally, after communist leader Mao Tse-tung told Chiang that if he stopped fi ghting the Red Army the Chinese Soviet government would help Chiang against Japan, Chiang fi nally agreed. Th e Kuomintang-Communist agreement ( July 5, 1937) called for the nationalists and communists to cooperate in driving the Japanese out of Peking and the rest of North China. Peace prevailed there for a time. But not for long. 2 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947/1948), p. 233.
8 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Official U.S. Foreign Policy During the 1930s, U.S. opinion opposed involvement in foreign wars. Congress responded in 1935 by passing neutrality legislation prohibiting trade in arms or implements of war with any belligerent nation. As FDR signed this legislation (S.J. Resolution 173) on August 31, 1935, he explained that “it was intended as an expression of the fi xed desire of the Government and the people of the United States to avoid any action which might involve us in war.” “Th e purpose,” he said, “is wholly excellent.” Emphasizing U.S. neutrality in international confl icts still more emphatically, Roosevelt added: “Th e policy of the Government is defi nitely committed to the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of any entanglements which would lead us into confl ict.” 3 In spite of FDR’s professed neutrality, however, he was apparently already considering the possibility of confl ict with Japan. Th e Offi ce of Naval Intelligence (ONI) whose duty it was to collect and analyze pertinent information for the Navy, was then assembling material about potential Japanese and communist espionage agents. For instance, the ONI “carded” Japanese residents in the New York area for use in “corralling the individuals for internment or breaking down any system of espionage or sabotage” in the event of a confl ict. 4 In an August 10, 1936, memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William D. Leahy, FDR sanctioned this operation. He “expressed his support . . . for locating all Japanese for possible incarceration in a ‘concentration camp’ during a crisis.” 5 FDR was a charming, charismatic, and convincing speaker. From 1935, when he signed the Neutrality Act, until the attack 3 Roosevelt, Th e Public Papers and Addresses, 1935, vol. 4, pp. 345–46. 4 Jeffrey M. Dorwart, Confl ict of Duty: The U.S. Navy’s Intelligence Dilemma, 1919–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 65. 5 Roosevelt, August 10, 1936 memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William D. Leahy. Quoted in Dorwart, Confl ict of Duty, p. 65.
- Page 2: PEARL HARBOR THE SEEDS AND FRUITS O
- Page 5 and 6: ISBN: 978-1-933550-33-6 Copyright
- Page 7 and 8: vi Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Frui
- Page 9 and 10: viii Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fr
- Page 12 and 13: Author’s Preface When the attack
- Page 14 and 15: Author’s Preface xiii Washington
- Page 16 and 17: Foreword On October 28, 1944, in Wa
- Page 18 and 19: Foreword xvii revealed a great deal
- Page 20 and 21: Acknowledgments As my husband notes
- Page 22: Acknowledgments xxi been intercepte
- Page 26 and 27: 1. U.S. International Policy: 1933-
- Page 28 and 29: U.S. International Policy: 1933-194
- Page 32 and 33: U.S. International Policy: 1933-194
- Page 34 and 35: U.S. International Policy: 1933-194
- Page 36 and 37: U.S. International Policy: 1933-194
- Page 38 and 39: U.S. International Policy: 1933-194
- Page 40 and 41: U.S. International Policy: 1933-194
- Page 42 and 43: U.S. International Policy: 1933-194
- Page 44 and 45: U.S. International Policy: 1933-194
- Page 46 and 47: U.S. International Policy: 1933-194
- Page 48 and 49: U.S. International Policy: 1933-194
- Page 50 and 51: U.S. International Policy: 1933-194
- Page 52 and 53: 2. Foreign Relations in an Election
- Page 54 and 55: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 56 and 57: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 58 and 59: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 60 and 61: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 62 and 63: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 64 and 65: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 66 and 67: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 68 and 69: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 70 and 71: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 72 and 73: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 74 and 75: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 76 and 77: 3. U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthene
- Page 78 and 79: U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 5
U.S. International Policy: 1933–1940 7<br />
support <strong>of</strong> the American people.” 2 Th e League <strong>of</strong> Nations investigated<br />
the “Manchurian incident” <strong>and</strong> issued a report blaming<br />
Japan. Japan <strong>and</strong> Britain disagreed with the League’s report.<br />
However, it was accepted <strong>and</strong> in 1933 Japan withdrew from the<br />
League.<br />
After the death in 1925 <strong>of</strong> Sun Yat-sen, revolutionary leader<br />
<strong>and</strong> president <strong>of</strong> the Southern Chinese Republic, Chiang Kaishek<br />
assumed the presidency. Chiang began trying to unite the<br />
country. Th e communists intervened, sometimes for, sometimes<br />
against, Chiang’s nationalist forces. Th ere was almost constant<br />
fi ghting by <strong>and</strong> among Chiang’s nationalists, the warlords, the<br />
Chinese communists <strong>and</strong> the Russian communists. When the<br />
Chinese boycotted Japanese textiles, the Japanese retaliated by<br />
bombarding <strong>and</strong> sending troops to the Shanghai International<br />
Settlement ( January 28–March 4, 1932). Many were killed. U.S.<br />
sympathy was with the Chinese; the Japanese were portrayed as<br />
the aggressors. After fi erce fi ghting, the Japanese retreated temporarily,<br />
<strong>and</strong> the boycott was brought to an end. Another time<br />
when Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist forces threatened Japan’s<br />
economic <strong>and</strong> industrial interests in Manchuria, Japan called<br />
up 5,000 troops to protect her merchants there. Th e Russian<br />
Communists <strong>and</strong> the Chinese Communists were both heavily<br />
involved. Finally, after communist leader Mao Tse-tung told<br />
Chiang that if he stopped fi ghting the Red Army the Chinese<br />
Soviet government would help Chiang against Japan, Chiang<br />
fi nally agreed. Th e Kuomintang-Communist agreement ( July 5,<br />
1937) called for the nationalists <strong>and</strong> communists to cooperate in<br />
driving the Japanese out <strong>of</strong> Peking <strong>and</strong> the rest <strong>of</strong> North China.<br />
Peace prevailed there for a time. But not for long.<br />
2 Henry L. Stimson <strong>and</strong> McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace <strong>and</strong> War<br />
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947/1948), p. 233.