Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

December 6, Part 2 275
Neither mentioned Pearl Harbor. Nor did they give any “indication
that tomorrow was necessarily the day.” And “[t]here was no
mention made of sending any further warning or alert.” 16
“[S]ince war was imminent,” Hopkins ventured, “. . . since
war was undoubtedly going to come at the convenience of the
Japanese, it was too bad that we could not strike the fi rst blow
and prevent any sort of surprise.”
Th e president nodded. “No, we can’t do that. We are a democracy
and a peaceful people.” Th en he raised his voice: “But we
have a good record.” FDR implied we would have to stand on
that record, that “we could not make the fi rst overt move. We
would have to wait until it came.” 17
Roosevelt went on to tell Hopkins that he had prepared a
message for Hirohito, the Japanese emperor, “concerning the
presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in eff ect requesting
their withdrawal.” 18 FDR had not followed the usual procedure
in sending this cable, he said. Rather than addressing it to Tojo as
prime minister, FDR “made a point of the fact that he had sent it
to the Emperor as Chief of State.” Th e president must have been
thinking also about how he would describe the situation in the
speech that had been prepared in the State Department for him
to present to Congress if he did not receive a satisfactory reply
from Hirohito.
FDR tried, unsuccessfully, to phone Chief of Naval Operations
Stark. When told Stark was at the theater, Roosevelt said he could
reach Stark later and hung up. FDR then returned the papers to
Schulz, who left. 19
16Ibid. Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee.
17Ibid., part 10, pp. 4659–71, especially pp. 4662–63, Schulz testimony before
the Joint Committee.
18Ibid., p. 4663. Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee.
19Ibid., pp. 4663–64, Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee.