Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

274 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
message for the president.” Schulz was to take it to Roosevelt
immediately. 13
When the fi rst 13 parts of the 14-part answer were in clear
form, typed up, and ready for distribution, Kramer
proceeded at once to the White House, left a folder [with
Beardall’s aide, Schulz] with that 13-part message and one
or two others with rather emphatic instructions to get to the
president as quickly as possible. Schulz immediately left with
the locked pouch for the president’s study. Th e president was
entertaining at the moment, 14
but when he learned the courier had arrived he left his guests for
his White House study. Schulz opened the pouch and personally
handed the president the papers, “perhaps 15 typewritten pages”
clipped together, which included the fi rst 13 parts of Japan’s
14-part reply to our November 26 note. Schulz waited—“perhaps
10 minutes”—while “[t]he president read the papers.” “Th en he
[FDR] handed them to [his friend and close associate] Mr.
[Harry] Hopkins,” who read them and returned them to the
president. 15
Th e president then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in
substance . . . “Th is means war.” Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they
discussed then, for perhaps 5 minutes, the situation of the
Japanese forces, that is, their deployment.
Th e Japanese had already landed in Indochina. Indochina
was the only geographical location they mentioned. FDR and
Hopkins speculated as to where the Japanese would move next.
13Ibid., part 10, pp. 4661, 4668, Schulz testimony before the Joint
Committee.
14Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI, September 13,
1944.
15Ibid., part 10, pp. 4659–71. Schulz testimony before Joint Committee.